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endogenous control.
1. Filter or Disengagement?
by Stephen R. Arnott
12 and Jay Pratt
1
1University of Toronto, Ontario, Canada
2Rotman Research Institute, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Ruz and Lupiáñez have  provided a comprehensive review of the
attentional capture research and we agree with their conclusion that attentional
capture is automatic by default, but can be modulated by endogenous factors.
One such endogenous factor is an attentional control setting, whereby top-
down processes  largely determine what  type of visual events will  capture
attention.  As noted by Ruz and Lupiáñez, there is considerable evidence both
for attentional control settings and for the significant impact  such  settings
have on various types of attentional tasks (although there is evidence that, in
certain situations, bottom-up processes may largely determine behavior).
Of  particular interest to us was the discussion on how attentional
control settings operate.  In their original work regarding the influence of task
demands on attentional capture, Folk and Remington (e.g., Folk, Remington
&  Johnston, 1992; Folk, Remington & Wright, 1994)  conceived the
attentional control setting as a filter that allows attention to be captured at
locations where a peripheral event (i.e., the cue) shares some critical feature
with  the  task  (i.e., the target).  Thus, according to Folk  and  Remington,
attention is not allocated to locations where the cue does not share some task
relevant feature with the target (see also, Remington, Folk & McLean, 2001).
Recently, Theeuwes and colleagues suggested  that attentional control
settings  are more likely to operate through  the rapid disengagement of
attention from a cued location (Theeuwes, Atchley & Kramer, 2000).  Their
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hypothesis is that any salient cue will reflexively capture attention, but if the
cue is not relevant to the task, the attentional control setting will  rapidly
disengage attention from the cued location and no cueing effect will be found
at a short SOA.  By manipulating cue-target SOAs, Theeuwes et al. argued
that the rapid disengagement of attention occurs approximately 150 ms after
the onset of the cue.        
We believe there are three recent pieces of evidence from our lab that
are more consistent with the rapid disengagement hypothesis of Theeuwes et
al. (2000) than the filter hypothesis of Folk and Remington.  First, our event-
related potential (ERP) results indicated that stimulus-related differences do
not become evident over primary visual areas until approximately 165-185 ms
post-onset (Arnott, Pratt, Shore & Alain, 2001).  During this time, smaller N1
amplitudes were observed when a distractor’s features were not target-relevant
as compared to when they were relevant.  Because this ERP component is
related to discrimination processes (Vogel & Luck, 2000), our N1 effects may
reflect the relatively early disengagement of attention from a stimulus when it
does not share target  relevant  features.  Thus, although a person  may be
endogenously set to attend to a certain feature, it takes approximately 150 ms
before the top-down modulation can override the stimulus-driven capture.
The second piece of evidence comes from the variation of the classic
Folk  and  Remington paradigm (Folk et al.,  1992) used by Pratt and
McAuliffe (In Press).  At the 150 ms SOA, as expected, they found that only
uninformative  cues  that  shared a target-relevant  feature  produced  cueing
effects.  Interestingly, and unexpectedly, when the SOA was increased to 800
ms in order to examine inhibition of return (IOR) effects, IOR was found for
onset cues regardless of the target defining feature (i.e., whether it was onset
or color).  In other words, the onset cues produced IOR with targets that were
both consistent (onset) and inconsistent (color) with the attentional control
setting.  Assuming that  IOR is produced only after attention has  been
allocated and then withdrawn from a peripheral location, the results from Pratt
and McAuliffe suggest  that the onset cues were  attended to despite any
particular attentional control setting.  Overall, these results are consistent with
the rapid disengagement hypothesis of Theeuwes et al., whereby salient onset
cues are attended to and will therefore produce IOR at long SOAs, but may or
may not show cueing effects at short SOAs depending on the attentional
control setting.      
Thirdly, we are currently testing the disengagement hypothesis by
exploiting the phenomenon of attentional  repulsion.  Attentional  repulsion
refers to the perceived displacement of a Vernier stimulus in a direction that is
opposite to a brief peripheral cue (Suzuki & Cavanagh, 1997).  Because the
repulsion effect is most evident at cue-target SOAs of less than 200 ms, it is
an ideal phenomenon with which to test the disengagement hypothesis.  In our
study, we altered the attentional repulsion paradigm such that observers were
encouraged to adopt an attentional set for a specific color (i.e., were only
required to make the perceptual judgements when the Vernier stimuli were
‘red’).  Our cue display consisted of four simultaneously presented cues (one
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Following our example, two of these cues, always diagonally opposite, were
colored red.  If attention was preferentially attracted to the cues sharing the
target-relevant feature like the contingent-orienting hypothesis  predicts, we
expected to find Vernier judgements shifted in directions opposite to the red
cues (i.e., attentional repulsion).  Alternatively, if all onset cues initially attract
attention as the disengagement hypothesis predicts, we would not expect to
find the repulsion effect.  In accordance with the disengagment hypothesis we
did not find the repulsion effect, suggesting that attention had not yet been
disengaged from those cues sharing the ‘irrelevant’ target features.
Although we have presented three recent pieces of evidence favoring the
disengagement hypothesis of Theeuwes et al., it is important to note that there
is also evidence favoring the filter hypothesis of Folk and Remington (e.g.,
Remington et al.,  2001).  Given the impact that attentional control settings
have on the manner in which our attention is allocated in the visual field, it will
be important for future research to determine exactly how attentional control
settings operate.
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2. Can attention capture visual awareness?
by Paolo Bartolomeo
*
Centre Paul Broca, Paris
In  their  scholarly and useful  review of the literature on attentional
capture, Ruz & Lupiáñez conclude that attentional capture is largely automatic
process, because it occurs “by default”, in the absence of a specific strategic
set, but can be endogenously modulated. In this commentary I will  try to
interpret  evidence  from  brain-damaged patients with  unilateral neglect as
resulting from an asymmetry of functioning of processes related to attentional
capture,  and to propose an important role of these processes in visual
awareness.
Left unilateral neglect is a neurological condition occurring  after
damage to the posterior part of the right hemisphere. Neglect patients live in a
halved world, being unable to orient or respond to left-sided  events. They
bump into furniture on their left side, do not eat from the left part of the dish,
and do not answer to people standing on their left. In contrast, they show a
pathological, “magnetic” attraction toward right-sided objects. Their attention
seems to be captured rapidly and compulsively by right-sided objects, even
when  these are irrelevant to the current  task.  For  example, in clinical
examination, when the examiner briefly moves the fingers of either or both
hands in patients’ visual fields in order to test for visual field defect, neglect
patients often compulsively look at the  hand on their right as soon as it
appears in their visual field, before  the  actual  administration of stimuli
(Gainotti, D'Erme, & Bartolomeo, 1991). Another example comes from the
line cancellation task, in which patients are presented with a sheet containing
several lines and asked to draw over all of them with a pencil mark. Neglect
patients often omit to cancel left-sided lines. In an ingenious variant of this
task, neglect patients had to draw over lines or to erase them, and showed
fewer omissions in the ‘erase’ than in the ‘draw’ condition (Mark, Kooistra,
&  Heilman,  1988).  This  pattern of results  suggests  that  right-sided  lines
attracted patients’ attention when they were crossed by a pencil mark, whereas
rendering these lines invisible by erasing them obviously nullified this effect,
thus  decreasing  neglect. In a Posner-type  reaction  time task, the mere
appearance of the bilateral placeholder boxes was capable of further slowing
patients’ response latencies  for  left  targets  (as  compared to a condition
without boxes), as if the right-sided boxes attracted patients’ attention before
the actual targets appeared (D'Erme, Robertson, Bartolomeo, Daniele, &
Gainotti, 1992). Taken together, these results strongly suggest that a crucial
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disorder in left neglect is a spatial asymmetry of processes  involved in
exogenous orienting of attention (Bartolomeo & Chokron, 2002). What can
be the functional basis of this bias? A first hypothesis could be that left
neglect stems from a disordered mental representation of the left half of space
(see, e.g.,  Bisiach, 1993), such that left-sided objects have a lesser power to
attract attention, perhaps as a result of being less perceptually salient than their
right-sided counterparts. However,  there  seems to be no rigid boundary
between left (neglected) and right (non-neglected) space in left neglect; rather,
patients’ performance seems to follow a left-to-right spatial gradient; even in
the right, non-neglected space their performance is better for (relatively) right-
sided items than for (relatively) left-sided items (Kinsbourne, 1993; Làdavas,
Petronio, & Umiltà, 1990). Indeed, Marshall and Halligan (1989)  reported
that targets could be omitted in a shape cancellation task  independently of
their position with respect of the midsagittal plane, and concluded that ‘right
attentional capture’ might be a better description of patients’  performance
than ‘left neglect’.
Thus, one can imagine that in neglect a directional (rather than
hemispatial)  asymmetry of processes  involved in attentional  capture,  with
capture form right-sided events being easier and/or faster than capture form
left-sided events, is at work. It is beyond the scope of this commentary to
discuss  the  issue of whether  this asymmetry results from an excessive
facilitation for rightward orienting (see, e.g., Kinsbourne, 1993), or a deficit of
leftward orienting (e.g., Heilman, Watson, & Valenstein, 1993; Riddoch &
Humphreys, 1987), or both (see Bartolomeo & Chokron, 1999, for data and
discussion relevant to this issue). What is of interest here is that an attentional
bias primarily affecting exogenous orienting can lead to a dramatic lack of
awareness for a huge portion of the patients’ space. This is reminiscent of
situations in which  normal individuals show (less dramatic)  forms of
unawareness for perceptually salient stimuli, as in the “change  blindness”
experiments (recently reviewed by O'Regan & Noë, 2001), and suggests that
processes  underlying  attentional  capture,  such as exogenous orienting of
attention, are necessary for our phenomenal awareness of the visual world
(Bartolomeo & Chokron, in press). It is an interesting possibility that research
on attentional capture may eventually shed light on the mechanisms of visual
awareness.
Ruz & Lupiáñez review evidence suggesting that attentional capture can
be modulated by top-down processes, such as those related to the subjects’
goals and strategies. Can neglect patients use these processes to compensate
for their neglect? The answer seems to be yes, but has to be further qualified.
First, it is well known that a number of patients clinically recover from neglect,
either  spontaneously or after rehabilitation. Evidence  suggests  that these
patients in fact learn to compensate for an early right attentional capture with a
later leftward orienting (Bartolomeo, 1997; Mattingley, Bradshaw, Bradshaw,
& Nettleton, 1994), perhaps through the use of an active inhibition for right-
sided items (Bartolomeo, 2000). Second, also patients with chronic neglect are
able to exert some top-down control on their attentional  orienting
(Bartolomeo, Siéroff, Decaix, & Chokron, 2001; Duncan et al., 1999; Làdavas,Commentaries on Ruz & Lupiáñez (2002) 316
Carletti, & Gori, 1994; Smania et al., 1998). Perhaps they can do so only in a
narrow  experimental  set,  and not in real  life,  because their endogenous
orienting  processes  are too slow to cope with  the  ever-changing  visual
environment of everyday life (Bartolomeo et al.,  2001).  Thus,  (relatively)
preserved  endogenous processes are apparently insufficient for a full
awareness of the visual environment, if attentional capture is laterally biased.
Further research on unilateral neglect, perhaps employing some of the clever
experimental paradigms reviewed by Ruz & Lupiáñez, may shed further light
on attentional capture and on its relationships with visual awareness.
REFERENCES
Bartolomeo, P. (1997). The novelty effect in recovered  hemineglect.  Cortex, 33(2),  323-
332.
Bartolomeo, P. (2000). Inhibitory processes and compensation for spatial bias after  right
hemisphere damage. Neuropsychological Rehabilitation, 10(5), 511-526.
Bartolomeo, P., & Chokron, S. (1999). Left unilateral neglect or right hyperattention?
Neurology, 53, 2023-2027.
Bartolomeo, P., & Chokron, S. (2002). Orienting of attention in left unilateral neglect.
Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Reviews, 26(2), 217-234.
Bartolomeo, P., & Chokron, S. (in press). Visual awareness relies on exogenous orienting
of attention: evidence from unilateral neglect (Commentary on O'Regan and Noë: A
sensorimotor account  of  vision  and  visual consciousness). Behavioral  and  Brain
Sciences.
Bartolomeo, P., Siéroff, E., Decaix, C., & Chokron, S. (2001). Modulating the attentional
bias in unilateral neglect: The effects of the strategic set.  Experimental Brain
Research, 137(3/4), 424-431.
Bisiach, E. (1993). Mental representation in unilateral neglect and related disorders.  The
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 46A(3), 435-461.
D'Erme, P.,  Robertson, I., Bartolomeo,  P.,  Daniele, A., & Gainotti, G. (1992). Early
rightwards orienting of attention on simple reaction  time  performance in patients
with left-sided neglect. Neuropsychologia, 30(11), 989-1000.
Duncan, J., Bundesen, C., Olson, A., Humphreys, G., Chavda, S., & Shibuya, H. (1999).
Systematic analysis of deficits in visual attention. Journal of Experimental
Psychology: General, 128(4), 450-478.
Gainotti, G., D'Erme, P., & Bartolomeo, P. (1991). Early orientation of attention toward
the half space  ipsilateral to the lesion in patients with unilateral brain damage.
Journal of Neurology, Neurosurgery and Psychiatry, 54, 1082-1089.
Heilman, K. M., Watson, R. T., & Valenstein, E. (1993). Neglect and related disorders. In
K. M. Heilman & E. Valenstein (Eds.), Clinical  Neuropsychology  (3rd  ed., pp.
279-336). New York: Oxford University Press.
Kinsbourne, M. (1993). Orientational bias model of unilateral neglect: Evidence from
attentional gradients within hemispace. In I. H. Robertson & J. C. Marshall (Eds.),
Unilateral Neglect: Clinical and  Experimental  Studies  (pp. 63-86). Hove (UK):
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
Làdavas,  E., Carletti, M., & Gori, G. (1994). Automatic and  voluntary orienting of
attention in patients with visual neglect: horizontal and  vertical  dimensions.
Neuropsychologia, 32, 1195-1208.Commentaries on Ruz & Lupiáñez (2002) 317
Làdavas, E., Petronio, A., & Umiltà, C. (1990). The deployment of visual attention in the
intact field of hemineglect patients. Cortex, 26(3), 307-17.
Mark, V. W., Kooistra, C. A., & Heilman, K. M. (1988). Hemispatial neglect affected by
non-neglected stimuli. Neurology, 38(8), 640-643.
Marshall, J. C., & Halligan, P. W. (1989). Does the midsagittal plane play any privileged
role in "left" neglect? Cognitive Neuropsychology, 6(4), 403-422.
Mattingley, J. B., Bradshaw, J. L., Bradshaw, J. A., & Nettleton, N. C. (1994). Residual
rightward  attentional bias after apparent recovery from right hemisphere damage:
Implications  for a multicomponent model of neglect.  Journal of Neurology,
Neurosurgery and Psychiatry, 57, 597-604.
O'Regan, J. K., & Noë, A. (2001). A sensorimotor account of vision  and  visual
consciousness. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 24(5).
Riddoch, M. J., & Humphreys, G. W. (1987). Perception and action systems in unilateral
visual neglect. In M. Jeannerod (Ed.), Neurophysiological and Neuropsychological
Aspects of Spatial Neglect (Vol. 45, pp. 151-181). Amsterdam:  Elsevier  Science
Publishers.
Smania, N., Martini, M. C., Gambina, G., Tomelleri, G.,  Palamara,  A.,  Natale,  E., &
Marzi, C. A. (1998). The spatial distribution of visual attention in hemineglect and
extinction patients. Brain, 121(Pt 9), 1759-1770.Commentaries on Ruz & Lupiáñez (2002) 318
3. Modulability does not undermine the stimulus-driven  nature
of attentional capture
by Giovanni Galfano
*1 and Massimo Turatto
2
1Università di Padova, Padua, Italy
2Università di Trento, Trento, Italy
In the following paragraphs, we will argue that although many studies
reviewed by Ruz and Lupiáñez clearly show that a top-down modulation plays
an important role in determining the location to which attention will be
deployed, attentional capture is stimulus-driven in nature. We agree with the
authors' claim that the endogenous component is much more relevant than was
hypothesised by early works in the field, but we will  discuss data showing
that, under some critical conditions, it is possible to observe a purely stimulus-
driven attentional deployment, that is attentional capture by an item
characterised as being a salient singleton in a task-irrelevant feature
dimension.
       Criteria for defining a purely stimulus-driven attentional capture.
In our view  (Turatto & Galfano, 2001; also see Yantis,  1993), the
conditio sine qua non for defining a purely stimulus-driven attentional capture
is that the investigated feature must be completely irrelevant to the task at
hand. In order to rule out any top-down effects, there are two main criteria to
be met:
1)  The target defining attribute(s) must be clearly  and  totally
independent of and dissociated from the feature dimension of the irrelevant
singleton.
2) In a visual search paradigm with multiple-items displays, participants
must perform the task at hand by means of a Feature Search Mode (FSM);
that is, their attentional set must be restricted to the target defining attribute(s).
As reported by Ruz and Lupiáñez, Bacon and Egeth (1994; also see Lamy &
Tsal,  1999) proposed a distinction  that  has  proved to be very useful in
clarifying  some  apparently contradictory results emerged in the literature.
Specifically, they showed that results from previous studies taken as evidence
for stimulus-driven capture, were obtained under conditions where participants
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were allowed (e.g., Theeuwes, 1992) or even  coerced (Pashler, 1988) to
perform  the experimental task by means of a Singleton Detection Mode
(SDM), a 'search for the  discrepant  element, whatever it is' strategy. This
strategy implies that participants have a broad attentional  set  that  not only
includes the target defining features, but also the singleton features. Under
such conditions, any result showing that the presence of the singleton item
affected  performance cannot be said to show a purely stimulus-driven
phenomenon, since the adoption of an SDM  makes the singleton relevant
somehow.  One  possibility to make an SDM  ineffective  and to force
participants to adopt an FSM is to use a very inefficient visual search task
(Wolfe, 1998) in which the target does not pop-out from the background,
which  means  that  all  attentional  resources must be focused on the target
defining attributes. Reformulated in the perceptual load hypothesis  (Lavie,
1995)  framework,  this  criterion would state that a real stimulus-driven
attentional capture might be said to occur under conditions of high perceptual
load only.
In  the next paragraph we report evidence  from studies whose
experimental conditions were as such as to fully conform to both the criteria
discussed above.
The peril of relying on null  results:  Evidence that attentional
capture is not always contingent.
Evidence have been discussed by Ruz and Lupiáñez that would confirm
the  view  that  not  all visual properties  are equally effective in capturing
attention. We agree with  this point as long as attentional  capture is not
considered as an 'all-or-none' phenomenon. We believe  that the general
distinction of visual features in static and dynamic (see, e.g., Folk, Remington,
& Johnston, 1992)  has both a theoretical and an empirical validity. In fact,
many studies have shown that a task-irrelevant onset singleton is able to attract
attention to its location (Yantis, 1998). As Ruz and Lupiáñez have pointed out,
the fact that abrupt visual onsets receive a high attentional priority might rely
on two different sub-properties characterising this kind of stimuli: an abrupt
luminance change and/or a new object status (Yantis & Hillstrom, 1994). The
relevant fact, in our opinion, is that whereas static discontinuities (stimuli that
vary along space) such as those produced by the manipulation of colour, form,
or  luminance  did not prove to capture attention automatically,  dynamic
discontinuities (stimuli that vary along both space and time) such as abrupt
onsets do show a clear stimulus-driven attentional capture (e.g., Jonides &
Yantis,  1988). This result by itself allows one to argue that employing the
classic display-size method to assess  the phenomenon, a stimulus-driven
capture emerges only if the task irrelevant singletons are abrupt onsets. The
observed lack of evidence  for  stimulus-driven  attentional  capture by static
discontinuities, however, does not necessarily speak against the possibility that
salient task-irrelevant singletons in the colour or shape  feature  dimensions
grab attention involuntarily. What Jonides and Yantis' results say is simply
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Johnson, 1990), clearly detectable by the display-size method. This, by itself,
does not rule out the possibility that by using a more sensitive method, a
stimulus-driven  attentional  capture might emerge even  for  stimuli
characterised as being irrelevant static singletons. In fact, any claim based on a
null result can say  very little about the nature of the attentional capture
phenomenon.
This idea has motivated many subsequent studies in pursuing stimulus-
driven attentional capture by static discontinuities by employing different
stimulus arrays from those used by Jonides and Yantis (e.g., Folk & Annett,
1994; Todd & Kramer, 1994; Yantis & Egeth, 1999), and, more importantly,
different methodologies for assessing attentional  capture (e.g., Gibson &
Jiang, 1998). The null result relying on the lack of stimulus-driven attentional
capture by static discontinuities was replicated in all the above cited studies.
However, recent evidence has been reported that jeopardises  the  claim that
static discontinuities  are not able to grab  attention in a purely bottom-up
manner. Theeuwes and Burger (1998; also see Theeuwes, Atchley, & Kramer,
2000), using the method termed 'Identity Intrusion' based on the 'Additional
singleton' paradigm (Simons, 2000), showed that, in a letter search task where
participants were to decide which of two possible targets was present in a
background of distractor letters, an irrelevant singleton colour distractor that
was never the target affected performance producing a significant decrease in
RTs when the singleton distractor identity was compatible with the target letter
compared to when the singleton distractor identity was incompatible with it.
This result was taken as evidence that the irrelevant colour singleton captured
attention in a stimulus-driven manner. This  interpretation  accounts  for the
compatibility effect and is supported by two considerations. First, the colour
singleton was never the target. Second, the letter search task proved to engage
participants in an inefficient search (i.e.,  steep  slopes in RTs plotted as a
function of display size). Thus, both criteria indicated above for defining a
stimulus-driven  attentional  capture are met. Moreover, the presence of a
compatibility effect rules out the possibility that the results are accountable in
terms of a filtering cost (Folk & Remington, 1998) rather than in terms of a
spatial shift of attention.
In a more recent paper, we (Turatto & Galfano, 2000) have shown that a
processing  advantage  for  when the target appears at the  singleton (an
irrelevant unique item in colour, form, or luminance) location can be observed
using a procedure we called the 'Distance method'. Our method adopts the
logic of the 'Irrelevant feature search' paradigm (Simons, 2000), and has the
advantage of requiring a single display size, with a fixed number of elements.
In our study, participants were  looking  for  the  presence or absence of a
vertical line segment (the target) embedded among variously tilted distractor
segments. Line segments were presented inside shapes, whose features were
manipulated to create the irrelevant singleton (also see Theeuwes, 1992). The
target, when present, appeared at the singleton location in 1/n of target present
trials (where n is display-size). Participants were more accurate in finding the
target when it appeared inside the singleton element than when it appeared in
the more accurate of the non singleton locations. As target defining attributesCommentaries on Ruz & Lupiáñez (2002) 321
forming participants'  attentional  set concerned orientation (and not colour,
shape, or luminance), we clearly met the first criterion for defining a stimulus-
driven capture. The steep slopes observed in a similar search task with no
singleton in which we varied display-size, ensured us that the task was very
resource-demanding (i.e., a non-efficient search) thus allowing for reasonably
ruling out the possibility that participants performed the task by means of an
SDM. In another paper (Turatto & Galfano, 2001) where colour was the only
investigated feature, we have replicated this finding with a T-L task (leading to
a non efficient search: Wolfe, 1998) and RTs as the main dependent variable.
Crucially, we have  included a no-singleton condition mixed with  singleton
trials in the same block, and we have observed that participants were faster in
finding the target when it was at the singleton location than the no-singleton
condition. This result favours an interpretation in terms of spatial capture and
definitely  rules out the  possibility of explaining the singleton-advantage
pattern as a filtering cost (see Turatto & Galfano, 2001).
Ruz and Lupiáñez argue that our results may be interpreted as evidence
of an attentional misguidance effect (see Todd & Kramer, 1994) rather than as
evidence of stimulus-driven attentional capture. The attentional misguidance
hypothesis applies to the 'Irrelevant feature search' paradigm and claims that
participants may decide to start the search from the singleton location, which
would act as a sort of landmark. In this view,  any benefit shown by the
singleton would be the consequence of the adoption of a specific search
strategy, and therefore could be accounted for by invoking the involvement of
a top-down component. We do not agree with this interpretation of our data
on the basis of the fact that our experimental procedure fully met the criteria
for defining a purely stimulus-driven attentional capture. Moreover, in a more
recent paper (Turatto, Galfano, Gardini, & Mascetti, 2001), we have provided
evidence that rules out this alternative explanation of our previous data. In fact,
by comparing the sensitivity of the classic display-size method against that of
our  distance  method, we obtained evidence  for  stimulus-driven  attentional
capture by colour in the distance method only, thus replicating the findings of
Jonides and Yantis (1988). This result not only shows that the display-size
method is less  powerful than the distance method in detecting attentional
capture, but also rules out any alternative account of our previous findings
(Turatto & Galfano, 2000; 2001) in terms of attentional misguidance. In fact,
as this hypothesis assumes that our participants strategically decided to begin
the search  from  the salient item,  one would have  expected the attentional
capture pattern to emerge in both the display-size method and the distance
method. Because only the distance method was able to show  evidence for
such phenomenon, we can safely assume that the singleton was effectively not
treated by participants as a landmark from which to start the visual  search
task. This means that no relevant top-down component affected the results,
and that stimulus-driven control was therefore present in isolation.
In a rather different perspective from that of the typical paradigms used
in the attentional capture literature, Stolz (1996) has tested the widely accepted
implicit  view  that  exogenous  orienting  represents an encapsulated  system
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Posner & Petersen, 1990), there are three operations involved in orienting of
attention: engage, move  and disengage. In the terminology used by the
spotlight  metaphor, the engage operation would correspond to attentional
capture. Stolz (1996, Experiments 2 and 5) used a variant of the classical
spatial cueing paradigm where she had a word at the fixation location and a
word acting as the non-informative cue for the target location. Participants
were required to perform a discrimination task on the target. The crucial
manipulation was that the cue was semantically related to the fixation word on
half the trials and unrelated to it in the other half. Besides the classic validity
effect, the results showed that the semantic relationship between the fixation
word and the cue impaired performance in invalid trials only. This implies that
the semantic status of the cue influenced its ability to hold attention at the cued
location. The interference effect has been interpreted to take place at either the
move or disengage stages and, crucially, not at the engage stage, as no effect
of semantic relatedness was detected in valid trials. In sum, this pattern of
results is consistent with  the  notion  that, on valid trials, the cue captured
attention and that attentional capture is impervious to high-level influences
(see Pylyshyn, 1999 for a detailed discussion concerning the impenetrability
of perceptual processes determining where attention will be deployed).
Evidence  supporting this position also comes from the  results of a
study by Theeuwes et al. (2000; also see Theeuwes & Godijn, 2001), who
were interested in investigating the time course of stimulus-driven and goal-
directed  processes in controlling  visual  attention. By varying the SOA
between the onset of an irrelevant singleton and the onset of the target, these
researchers showed that top-down control is able to suppress stimulus-driven
capture only if participants are given enough time before target presentation
(also see Kim & Cave, 1999; 2001). Specifically, their findings are consistent
with the notion that top-down control does not operate at the level of early
visual processing and does not literally override bottom-up capture, but works
speeding up the operation of disengaging  attention  from  the  irrelevant
singleton  location  instead.  This  interpretation would also disentangle the
reason for why Folk et al. (1992) could not find evidence for stimulus-driven
capture either by a colour or an abrupt onset singleton using the spatial cueing
paradigm. In fact, in those experiments, the SOA between the onset of the
irrelevant cue and the onset of the search display was 150 ms. As noted by
Theeuwes et al. (2000), by the time the search array was presented in the Folk
et al. study, participants may have  been able to disengage  spatial  attention
from the location of the cue and to move the attentional focus over the location
of  the target. This  interpretation is also consistent with  the  finding of a
stimulus-driven  attentional  capture in our  previous  studies  (Turatto &
Galfano, 2000; 2001; Turatto et al.,  2001), where a 0-ms SOA between the
onset of the irrelevant singleton and the onset of the target was employed. It is
important to note that the study of Theeuwes et al. (2000; also see Kim &
Cave,  1999) is susceptible of an SDM  criticism. In fact,  the  procedure
employed did not ensure that participants used an FSM to find  the  target,
since the target always appeared inside a relevant  shape singleton (as in
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the different SOAs, allows one to assume  that the bottom-up  activation
produced by the 'irrelevant' colour singleton was stronger than the activation
of the top-down component produced by the template matching process.
The importance of saliency in visual behaviour.
Further contributions attesting the relevance of saliency and bottom-up
processes in human behaviour have been provided from other research fields,
such as neurophysiology or psychophysics. For example, Constantinidis and
Steinmetz (2001) recorded  activity  from single neurons in area 7a of the
Posterior Parietal Cortex, known to play a crucial role in orienting of spatial
attention and observed that, in a spatial multiple-stimulus display version of
the match-to-sample task, responses to salient  odd-coloured  targets  were
enhanced. Clearly,  this result does not represent evidence  for a stimulus-
driven capture by colour, as colour was the target defining attribute. However,
the pattern emerged testifies the importance of saliency in controlling visual
processing.  The  relevance of saliency  has also emerged in a series of
psychophysical studies conducted by Nothdurft (e.g., 1993; 2000a; 2000b).
For example, Nothdurft (2000a) showed that performance in responding to a
singleton target was significantly enhanced when the target was a singleton in
two feature dimensions compared to when it was a singleton in only one
feature. As in the case of the Constantinidis and Steinmetz (2001) study, this
result is no way evidence for stimulus-driven capture, but shows that saliency
per se relevantly  affects  visual  performance.  Evidence  that  bottom-up
processes are important in visual processing has also been provided both in
conjunction searches (Sobel & Cave, in press) and in the context of a recently
discovered phenomenon strongly related to the attentional capture research
field, that is Change Blindness (Simons, 2000). This latter effect refers to the
observation that repeated changes between scenes often go unnoticed for a
surprisingly long time (see, e.g., Turatto, Angrilli, Mazza, Umiltà, & Driver,
2002). In particular, Scholl (2000) has reported evidence that salient items,
even  when they are uncorrelated with the loci of change, show a dramatic
decrease in change blindness. This pattern of results has been interpreted as
evidence that the salient elements (late-onset items and colour singletons)
captured  attention in a stimulus-driven fashion  therefore  producing an
attenuated change blindness effect.
Finally, many computational models of visual attention make the clear
prediction  that a salient,  although  task-irrelevant singleton, would draw
attention on its location (e.g., Cave, 1999; Cave & Wolfe, 1990; Itti & Koch,
2000; Koch & Ullman, 1985; Li,  2002; Niebur & Koch, 1998; Parkhurst,
Law, & Niebur, 2002; Wolfe, 1994).  The recent evidence showing purely
stimulus-driven attentional capture give a critical empirical support to these
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Conclusion
In sum, we do not put into question the fact that endogenous factors
play a crucial role in determining attentional control. Our view is rather that,
saliency is also relevant and if early studies were unable to show a purely
stimulus-driven capture of attention by static discontinuities (i.e.,
discontinuities in feature dimensions whose ecological  priority is less
prominent than that of abrupt visual onsets, Yantis & Johnson, 1990), this
does not mean that the bottom-up component plays no role in controlling the
deployment of visual attention. In this  commentary,  based on previous
proposals (e.g., Yantis, 1993; Bacon & Egeth, 1994), we have suggested some
criteria to investigate stimulus-driven attentional control in isolation. As a
matter of fact, evidence from our and other labs (e.g., Turatto & Galfano,
2000; 2001; Turatto et al., 2001; Kim & Cave, 2001; Scholl, 2000; Theeuwes
& Burger, 1998) has appeared in the literature that shows that stimulus-driven
attentional capture by static singletons does indeed take place. We emphasise
that this growing evidence has been collected by carefully conforming to both
the criteria discussed above.
The null effect reported by previous studies is attributable either to the
low  sensitivity of the employed  experimental  paradigms  (e.g.,  Jonides &
Yantis, 1988) or to the adoption of the inappropriate temporal parameters (e.g.,
Folk et al., 1992), whereas the debate concerning the earlier evidence for the
phenomenon (see e.g., Bacon & Egeth, 1994; Lamy & Tsal, 1999; Pashler,
1988; Theeuwes, 1992) raised from the difficulty in studying the bottom-up
component in isolation.
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4. The relationship between attentional capture and awareness
by Richard Godijn and Jan Theeuwes
*
Vrije Universiteit, The Netherlands
The target article by Ruz and Lupiáñez (R&L) is a state of the art review
on  attentional  capture. In this  commentary we address  the relationship
between attentional capture and awareness. Although this issue  was not
addressed by R&L we feel it is an important issue  that  requires some
elaboration. In everyday life we have  the subjective impression that we are
consciously aware of what captures our attention. However, the question may
be asked whether events that capture attention always reach our awareness.
This is an important issue, since awareness has  been  used in so-called
inattentional  blindness studies as an indicator of attentional capture. For
example, in Mack and Rock (1998) participants  were  required to judge
whether the horizontal or vertical arm of a cross was longest. On a single
critical trial an additional object appeared simultaneously with the cross and
after responding to the cross participants were asked whether they noticed
anything that had not been present on the previous trials. Participants often
failed to report the additional object even when it had a different color or when
it moved during the trial. Findings from inattentional blindness studies are
typically interpreted as evidence that unexpected salient events often do not
capture our attention (e.g. Mack & Rock, 1998). However, this measure of
attention is different from the measures that are typically used in attentional
capture studies. As indicated by R&L attentional capture is typically inferred
from response time differences between conditions with and without irrelevant
distractors. When a task-irrelevant distractor increases the time to respond to a
target it is assumed that it captured attention. R&L refer to two studies that
show that objects that affect reaction times, indicative of attentional capture, do
not necessarily reach awareness (McCormick, 1997; Danziger et al.,  1998).
Further evidence for a dissociation between attentional capture and awareness
comes from the oculomotor capture paradigm (e.g. Theeuwes et al.,  1998;
1999). In this paradigm participants are required to execute an eye movement
to a uniquely colored target circle and to ignore the onset of a new circle. The
results of Theeuwes et al. (1998; 1999) revealed that onsets not only captured
attention, but also the eyes. Despite the fact that after the eye movement to the
onset the eyes often had to move in a completely different direction to reach
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the target, participants were often not aware that the onset affected their eye
movement behavior (see Mokler & Fischer, 1999 for similar results). Thus,
not only are participants often unaware of the presence of unexpected salient
objects (e.g. Mack & Rock, 1998), when they are informed about the salient
event  they are often not aware of the detrimental effects it has on their
behavior.
Although awareness and attentional capture can be dissociated, objects
that capture our  attention  often do reach our conscious awareness. It is
important to develop an understanding of the relationship between attentional
capture and awareness. Under what conditions does attentional capture lead to
awareness? Even  though R&L do not address this issue, it is important to
develop a framework for understanding the relationship between attentional
capture and awareness, since it would allow an integration of implicit
measures of attentional  capture  (e.g.  reaction  time  measures) and explicit
measures (awareness) of attentional capture (e.g. Simons, 2000).  
Most  and  Simons (2001) developed a preliminary framework for
understanding  attentional  capture  based on Neisser’s  (1967)  concept of
perceptual cycle. According to Neisser  perception is a gradual process
consisting of repeated cycles of visual exploration.  When a salient  object
appears in the visual environment it may capture attention, or in terms of Most
and Simons’ model, it may lead to a transient shift of attention. Each transient
shift of attention has the potential to alter the ongoing perceptual cycle, or
alternatively, it may trigger a new perceptual cycle. When this occurs attention
is  sustained on the object ultimately resulting in conscious awareness.
Whether objects enter the perceptual cycle depends on the  strength of the
signal (i.e. its salience) and its consistency with the adopted attentional set.
Most and Simons further distinguished between implicit attentional capture
and explicit attentional capture. Implicit attentional capture refers to the initial
transient shift of attention, which may affect behavior, but does not necessarily
lead to conscious  awareness.  Explicit attentional capture refers to the
sustained attention that occurs when an object enters a perceptual cycle and
leads to conscious awareness. In this framework the relationship between
attention (and attentional capture) and awareness is clear. Awareness requires
attention,  but  (implicit)  attentional  capture  does  not necessarily lead to
awareness.
The distinction between transient and sustained shifts of attention is
most  likely related to the speed of attentional  disengagement.  When
disengagement is relatively fast we may classify this as a the transient shift of
attention that is not sustained. On the other hand  when  disengagement is
relatively slow (for example, when the object that captured attention is similar
to the target), the transient shift of attention is followed by sustained attention.
Thus, when disengagement is fast it is likely that the object that captured
attention will  not reach awareness, but it may still affect behavior. When
disengagement of attention is slow it is likely that the object does  reach
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The speed of disengagement may play an important role in explaining
why there appears to be no evidence for capture in spatial cueing tasks as
used by Folk et al. (1992) when the cue does not match the task-relevant
properties of the target, while salient distractors in the additional singleton
paradigm  used by Theeuwes (e.g.  1991, 1994,1995) always appear to
capture attention. As argued before (Theeuwes et al.  2000;  Theeuwes &
Godijn, 2001), in the spatial cueing paradigm there is a delay between the to
be ignored cue and the search display. It is quite feasible that when the cue
does not match the target, attention is captured by the cue, but the transient
shift of attention is not followed by sustained attention and disengagement
is fast. However, when the cue matches the target, a sustained shift will
occur that does not result in fast disengagement of attention. Only in the
latter condition (i.e., when the cue matches the target) it would seem that
there is attentional capture, while in fact there is also attentional capture
when the cue does not match the target; yet by the time the search display
appears,  attention has already been disengaged from the cue location and
performance is not affected by the cue.
We believe  that the study of attentional  capture  will  benefit  from a
detailed examination of the relationships between attentional capture, speed of
disengagement and conscious awareness. This will  not only allow a better
understanding of attentional  processes, but it would provide a basis for
integrating results from different tasks such as the additional singleton task
(e.g. Theeuwes, 1994; 1995), the pre-cueing task (e.g. Folk et al., 1992) and
the inattentional blindness task (e.g. Mack & Rock, 1998).  
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5.  On  ecological requirements and possible mechanisms
underlying attentional capture
by Joachim Hoffmann
*
 University of Würzburg, Germany
Ruz & Lupiáñez (2002) review an important part of the recent literature
on attention which in my view expresses a paradigmatic shift. In the past, most
attentional research was focused on stimulus driven attentional control, which
corresponded to the general S-R orientation of Cognitive Psychology. Ulric
Neisser (1967, p.4) in his influential book “Cognitive Psychology”  stated
that „....the term cognition refers to all the processes by which the sensory
input is transformed, reduced, elaborated, stored, recovered, and used”.  Thus,
cognitive  processes  were  considered as being determined mainly by the
sensory  input. In the last ten years, however, it became  increasingly
acknowledged that intentionally driven executive processes strongly influence
stimulus processing. In attentional research this view is substantiated by the
reviewed evidence that the impact of distracting stimuli is at least modulated if
not determined by what the subject is voluntarily trying to attend (cf. also
Pashler, Johnston, & Ruthruff, 2001). In the present comment I will speculate
about ecological requirements and possible mechanisms that may underly this
interplay between stimulus driven and voluntarily driven attentional capture.
1. Humans are  multipurpose  “devices”.  Accordingly,  they are
equipped  with  both a terribly flexible  behavioral  apparatus and sensory
systems that are sensitive to millions of differences in external and internal
states as well. However, there is a fundamental discrepancy between behavior
and perception: Whereas at any given moment the behavioral output is usually
restricted to one single act or one single task, the senses  simultaneously
provide information about countless states and their current changes. Thus, at
any moment the senses provide much more information than needed in order
to appropriately perform an ongoing action or to accomplish a current task.
To deal with this problem, mechanisms have evolved that selectively facilitate
the impact of only those stimuli on behavior that are currently behaviorally
relevant.
On the other hand, to allow only stimuli that are currently relevant to
influence behavior entails the risk to overlook imminent dangers or to miss
more profitable options.  Thus, any organism is well  advised to remain
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sensitive  for  changes of the current situation despite concentrating on an
ongoing action or task. For example, animals who ignore the appearance of a
predator while feeding, would hardly survive and are unlikely to be found
among our evolutionary ancestors. Thus, it is reasonable to assume that the
evolved  mechanisms  are somehow able to manage a balance between
facilitating the impact of currently relevant information in order to maintain an
intention and continously monitoring the environment for  potentially
significant information on the other hand (Hoffmann, 1993; Goschke, 2002).
2. In vision currently relevant stimuli are selected by fixation, i.e. by
directing the eyes so that the target stimulus falls in both eyes on the region
with the greatest acuity, the fovea. But in order to do so, the “mind”  has to
know how exactly they eyes are to be moved. As this depends on the ever-
changing  locational relation of the head to the target,  the  necessary eye
movements are almost never prespecified. Under these conditions it would be
advantageous if a target would attract the gaze as soon as it appears in the
visual field, so that a parafoveal target would automatically trigger eye
movements that result in its fovealisation. For such a mechanism to work it is
mandatory to assume that the visual effects of the target are in some way
specified before the target is fixated. Otherwise it is impossible to see how
targets could attract fixation. In other words, it is to be assumed that searching
for a visual target includes anticipating its visual effects.
Intuition agrees with this consideration. If we look for our glasses, for a
certain book, for the home keys, etc., we have a more or less vivid  mental
image of how the objects we are searching for looks like. Besides intuition,
several theoretical conceptions also argued this way. For example Pillsbury
(1908, cited after Pashler, 1999)  stated:  “Searching  for  anything  consists
ordinarily of nothing more than walking about the place where the object is
supposed to be, with the idea of the object kept prominently in mind, and
thereby standing ready to facilitate the entrance of the perception  when it
offers  itself.”  Likewise Ach (1913,  1935)  speculated  that repeatedly
performing a certain action leads to the formation of what he called
“Bezugsvorstellung” (referential image), so that the intention to perform this
particular act again goes along with anticipating the relevant initial stimulation
to which the action has been successfully performed in the past. In the same
context Lewin (1928) argued that task relevant objects obtain what he called
“Aufforderungscharakter”  (stimulative nature, cf. also the concept of
‘affordances’ coined by Gibson, 1979).
More recently, Duncan & Humphreys (1989) stated that visual search
bases on “… matching input descriptions against an internal template of the
information needed in current behavior” (p.444), whereby they considered a
template as being “…an  advance specification of the information sought.”
(p.446). Finally, Pashler (1999) mentioned in his insightful book on attention
a finding that explicitely makes the point that an actually evoked mental image
affects attention: Participants were requested first to form a vivid  image of a
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sequential presentations of pictures in order to search for a digit interpolated
among the pictures. If one of the pictures in the series met the precedingly
evoked image it produced an “attentional blink”  effect, i.e. detection of the
digit was impaired if it was presented shortly after the critical picture. The
finding suggests that participants “…adopted a set to detect whatever they
had just formed an image of” (Pashler, 1999, p.249).
3. The readiness to perform an action or to accomplish a certain task
seems to evoke anticipations (images, ‘Bezugsvorstellungen’,  templates) of
experientially  relevant initial conditions.  Stimuli  that  correspond to the
anticipations presumably result in stronger activations than competing stimuli
simply because the to be evoked representations are already partially activated
in advance. If it is furthermore assumed that the relatively strongest activations
automatically attract the gaze and by this attention, anticipations appear as a
proper  mechanism to selectively facilitate processing of relevant  stimuli.
Correspondingly,  the efficiency of visual  search  should  depend on the
interplay between the quality and strength of current anticipations and the
features of targets and distractors:
First, anticipations are task  related,  i.e. they are determined by the
requirements of the given task. Accordingly, the attentional effects of the very
same stimuli depend on the current task. For example, in an experiment by
Kahneman, Treisman, & Burkell (1983) participants searched for a word in
white letters among nonsense strings of colored letters. If the target word was
merely to be detected it “popped out”. But if the target word was to be read,
search  was serial. Hoffmann and Grosser (1985) manipulated target
anticipations simply by naming the to be detected targets at different levels.
Participants searched for target objects in displays with a varying number of
pictured objects. The to be searched objects were among others indicated as
being a member of a subordinate or a primary concept. For  example,
participants either searched for a birch or a tree in a display in which the only
tree was a birch. Search was more efficient if participants searched for
primary concepts than for  more concrete categories (cf. also Hoffmann,
Grosser, & Klein, 1987). In order to take an example from another domain,
Durgin (2000) reported that in a Stroop task the interference caused by the
incongruent color of a color word substantially increased if participants were
required to move  the  cursor to a field of the designated color instead of
naming the word as usually required.
In all these studies, the attentional effects of very the same stimuli were
modulated by the requested task, which supports the general notion that the
“functional  defining attributes”  (Duncan, 1985) by which the search was
guided depend on task related anticipations. Participants who are ready to
respond to a white string presumably anticipate (search for) merely a white
string wheras participants who are ready to read the target word anticipate a
word like stimulus. Likewise, searching for a tree evokes the image of a tree
whereas searching for a birch evokes the more detailed image of a birch. And,
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fields presumably keep in mind the images of these ‘goal-colors’. If the to be
detected target is the only (parafoveal) stimulus which meets the anticipation
(as in the case of a white string or a tree), search is efficient and responses are
fast. If, however, the target needs fixation in order to meet the anticipation (as
in the case of a birch) or if distracting stimuli also meet the anticipation (as in
the search for a word amongst letter strings or in the case of colored color
words) serial search is needed and responses are delayed.
Second, within a given task set, the task related anticipations seem to
adapt to the variety of the experienced targets. A recent finding of Kunde,
Kiesel, & Hoffmann  (submitted)  may be taken to illustrate this  point:
Participants were requested to decide as fast as possible whether a presented
digit is smaller or larger than 5. The presentation of the target digits was
preceded by subliminal (masked) presentations of other digits. It is known
that  subliminal  stimuli,  despite not being consciously recognized, can
nevertheless prime assigned responses, so that congruent primes accelerate
and non-congruent primes decelerate the responses to the succeeding targets
(e.g. Dell’Acqua, & Grainger, 1999; Klotz, & Neumann, 1999; Neumann, &
Klotz, 1994; Wolff, & Rübeling, 1994). Kunde, et al. (submitted) extended
these findings by showing that the congruency effect for particular  primes
depended on the range of the used  targets.  If,  for  example,  participants
exclusively  responded to the targets 1, 4, 6, and 9, the primes 2 and 8
produced a congruency effect. If, however, only the digits 3,4, 6, and 7 were
used as targets, the primes 2 and 8 remained without any influence on RTs. In
other words, subliminal primes seem to affect response initiation only if they
belong to the range of the expected targets (cf. also Damian, 2001). This and
related  findings suggest that  participants learn to adapt their target
expectations (anticipations) to the experienced range of targets (either 1 to 4
versus 6 to 9 or 3/4 versus 6/7) and that subliminal primes affect the initiation
of the forthcoming responses only insofar as they meet the response related
target anticipations.
Third, if targets are to be distinguished from distracting stimuli, as it is
always the case in visual search, the task related anticipations seem to adapt
not simply to the target set but rather to the most simple features that allow a
reliable  distinction of target and non-target displays. The  “homogeneity
coding” hypothesis by Duncan & Humphreys (1989) provides an illustrative
example for such an adaptation. When participants repeatedly searched for a
target letter among homogenous  distractors, the targets not only  “popped
out” but responses to non-target displays were faster than to target displays.
The authors accounted for this unusual finding by assuming that participants
developed a readiness to respond to the global homogeneity of the non-target
displays  instead of responding to the local presence of a target. The
“singleton  search  strategy”  hypothesis by Bacon and Egeth (1994),
mentioned in the review, is completely in line with this argumentation. In both
hyotheses it is assumed that participants start to search for (to respond to) an
unspecific feature although the specific target is known, presumably because it
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the whole display than to anticipate a concrete target (cf. also Egeth, Folk,
Leber, Nakama, & Hendel, 2001).
In sum, the search for objects that allow current intentions to carry into
execution is a permanent and ubiquitous challenge. The available evidence
suggests that the basic mechanism to meet this challenge is the anticipation of
the initial stimulations that experientially warrants success of the forthcoming
actions (the attentional set).  Anticipations  shape and intensify the
representations of those stimuli that meet what has been anticipated. As the
gaze is automatically directed to the stimuli which are most strongly
represented, attention is automatically attracted most likely by those stimuli the
effects of which have been anticipated (contingent capture). Furthermore, the
evidence  suggests  that  for  making the search as efficient and smooth as
possible the task related anticipations (the attentional set) seems to adapt very
flexibly to current task requirements, to the experienced targets, and to
differences between targets and distractors as well.
4.  As introductory mentioned, to attend exclusively to task  relevant
stimuli entails possibly  fatal  risks.  Therefore animals like humans are
equipped with what has been called the orienting  reflex,  i.e. an immediate
orientation of all senses to intense stimuli or abrupt changes of the current
situation  (Pavlov,  1953/1916;  Sokolov,  1963).  However,  the stimuli that
release a reflexive orientation of attention are not fixed but rather are subject to
learning. For example, if we spend our first night in a tent we are scared by
any  new  unfamiliar  noise.  However,  after a few  nights we have  already
habituated and sleep undisturbed. Likewise, we adapt to a noisy site, to the
traffic  noise from a near highway, or to the noise of a party in the
neighborhood. Thus, in the same way as task related attentional sets adaptively
enhance the impact of just those stimuli that are currently appropriate, the
impact of stimuli that repeatedly disturb us is adaptively reduced if they are
behaviorally irrelevant. The same mechanism presumably works if in an
experimental setting  repeatedly  presented  distractors  affect us increasingly
less,  even if they are salient like singletons or abrupt onsets. However,
habituation of the orienting response is not to be expected if the distractors
have  features that are related to the simultaneously adapted  attentional  sets
(contingent  involuntary  orienting).  Furthermore, habituation should be
delayed if not prevented if the distractors  sufficiently often cue the target
location because under such conditions it might be that the distractors become
part of the attentional set as ocassionally helpful cues. That  besides
habituation distractors can also be voluntarily  ignored seems to me to be
unlikely. If the notion is correct that any content, we currently think off, works
like a set to detect corresponding stimuli (cf. point 2) the attempt to actively
ignore distractors should cause the opposite, just  like the noise of the
neighborhood party distracts us the more the more we voluntarily try to ignore
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Conclusion
The preceding speculations about ecological  requirements  underlying
attentional  capture lead to the conclusion  that attention does  not base on
separate mechanisms that work on incoming stimuli but rather on mechanisms
that  evolved in order to support an efficient  control of purposeful  goal
oriented behavior. Thus, attention does not start to work with the intrusion of
stimuli.  Rather,  attention  starts  with  intentions and is substantiated by
anticipations of intended stimulations before the corresponding  stimuli
appear. The only  exception  are stimuli that trigger a reflexive  orienting
response. But  even  the orienting response  quickly becomes habituated or
conditionalized according to behavioral experiences.  Thus in my view, the
present tentative conceptual analyses of attentional capture complements the
profound review of experimental data provided by Ruz and Lupiáñez (2002)
as it leads to the same conclusion: Attentional capture is primarily driven by
endogenous processes, and it is driven by stimuli only by default.
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6. What grabs us: Comment on Ruz & Lupianez
Bernhard Hommel
*
University of Leiden, The Netherlands
Ruz & Lupiáñez provide a broad, thorough  overview of our  present
understanding of visual attentional capture, that is, of the tendency of visual
events to attract our  attention. They come to the conclusion  that events
commonly attract attention by virtue of their fit with our current task goals and
task-related strategies, and the attentional selection criteria defined by them.
Only in rare, exceptional cases will purely bottom-up attentional capture occur,
such as when "no clear attentional set is established".
The picture Ruz & Lupiáñez draw fits nicely into the zeitgeist one can
observe in cognitive psychology  these  days.  Since the 1950s, when the
interest in cognition was revived by information-processing  approaches,
human performance was often considered to be stimulus-driven (Hommel,
Müsseler, Ascherleben & Prinz, in press). This legacy from the behavioristic
tradition  shines through in sometimes  more,  sometimes  less  obvious
ways—the perhaps most famous example of the latter being Neisser's (1967)
definition of cognitive psychology as the study of the "fate of the input". In
recent years, however, cognitive processes that precede and, indeed, sometimes
even  produce, stimulation have  attracted  more  and more interest. The
emergence of attentional-set approaches discussed by Ruz & Lupiáñez are but
one example, others are the study of task set in conflict tasks (e.g., Cohen,
Braver & O'Reilly, 1998; Cohen, Dunbar & McClelland, 1990) and in task-
switching performance (e.g., Allport, Styles & Hsieh, 1994; Meiran,  1996;
Rogers & Monsell, 1995), demonstrations of the role of intentions in
stimulus-response compatibility (e.g., Hommel, 1993), and investigations of
the linguistic control of spatial attention (e.g., Logan,  1995;  Spivey, Tyler,
Eberhard & Tanenhaus, 2001) and of motor performance (e.g., Gentilucci,
Benuzzi, Bertolani, Daprati & Gangitano, 2000).
As exemplified by Ruz & Lupiáñez' discussion, the picture emerging
from these investigations is not simple. And it is certainly not well captured by
the opposition of automatic versus intentional, or bottom-up versus top-down
processes. Rather, it seems  that goal states  lead to the implementation of
conditionally automatic (Bargh, 1992) cognitive processes that transform the
processing system into something like a cognitive reflex machinery (Hommel,
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2000). Indeed, this is what Ruz & Lupiáñez conclude: Task-specific goals
enable a set of automatically-running processes  that  under  particular
circumstances may process unwanted stimuli. From this perspective, research
on attentional capture promises to extend our insights into the interaction of
goals and the processes they affect. To do so more optimally, however, some
challenges are to be met on both theoretical and empirical sides.
Theoretical challenges
A  number of non-trivial theoretical problems remain to be addressed
and solving them may well  resolve at least some of the apparent empirical
discrepancies Ruz & Lupiáñez identify. What we for instance do not yet
really understand is, if attentional sets determine stimulus selection to a large
degree, how do they do that? Logan and Gordon (2001) have claimed that an
attentional set can be established by specifying or changing a single control
parameter. If so, how is this parameter translated into a "set", on what types of
stimulus codes ("physical", "phonological", or "semantic"; V1, V2, or
"higher") does it operate? And what are the conditions under which a set is
implemented? Is there just one level of sets (e.g., for color or for shape) or is
there a hierarchy of sets  with  low-level,  task-specific  sets  coexisting  with
higher-level, general goals (e.g., avoidance of life-threatening and unpleasant
events, seeking events that make us happy and satisfy basic needs). I find this
latter possibility very reasonable, but it would allow a set-theoretical post-hoc
account of almost any demonstration of attentional capture one can think of
without contributing anything to our insights on how attention works (see
Gibson, 1941, for an early warning). The challenge to be met  here is to
specify in more detail exactly what an attentional set may be, how it may work,
and on which conditions its implementation may depend.
On the other hand, the concept of "saliency" rests almost entirely on
intuition and it is often used in a way that comes close to circularity. Everyone
would agree that a single red circle  among 20 green circles is somehow
salient. But what if we increase the number of red circles to four, say. Is red
still salient? Are the red  circles  salient? If we consider  saliency as a
continuous variable of which stimuli can possess more or less, what then is
the relationship between saliency and attentional capture? Hard to believe it is
linear. Indeed, the saliency concept is only clear in the extreme cases that are
commonly investigated, so that post-hoc accounts in terms of "not enough" or
"too much saliency" are always difficult to rule out. Unfortunately, it is these
two concepts—attentional set and saliency—that represent the backbones of
the two types of approaches to attentional capture. Hence, as long as they are
as fuzzy as they are now it is not likely that the research based on them will
reach some sort of final conclusion.
Empirical Challenges
Apart from these theoretical issues there are also some more empirical
weaknesses Ruz & Lupiáñez' overview  can be taken to point at. Although
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endogenous and exogenous sources of attentional control interact the majority
of actual empirical research focuses on a single aspect of this question: under
what circumstances is searching for a feature singleton affected by the
presence of another, irrelevant singleton. This empirical  self-restriction
brings with it a whole bunch of theoretical limitations, which in several ways
confine our insights into attentional control to situations that are not really, or
at least not fully, representative for the everyday use of attentional capabilities.
First, although there are certainly situations in which people scan their
environment  for  the occurrence of one particular feature,  many other
circumstances are likely to require the search for feature conjunctions—just
think of looking for a friend of yours in a crowd,  going shopping, or
searching for a textbook suited for your introductory class. As the research on
attentional capture focuses almost exclusively on feature search tasks (with the
few exceptions Ruz & Lupiáñez discuss in their section on salience), there is
not much we know about whether and when irrelevant singletons distract our
attention under conjunction search. In view of the limited evidence for true
capture in singleton-search tasks and the entire absence of capture in the few
studies on conjunction search, there is some reason to worry about the
relevance of attentional capture  for understanding the nature of human
attention.
Second, whether attentional capture can count as strictly automatic or
not, it seems clear that events attract our attention the more the more salient
they are. However, in capture research the saliency of a given  stimulus is
(implicitly) defined with respect to the other, currently available stimuli only.
True, it is intuitively obvious that one or a few oddballs may attract attention
merely by being different, but objects and  events may be odd for other
reasons than possessing a feature that other, simultaneously presented stimuli
do not. A number of examples for that stem from Berlyne's extensive work on
the effects of novelty and oddity on visual attention (e.g., Berlyne, 1960),
which is widely ignored by the capture literature. For  instance,  stimuli are
fixated more likely and longer the more irregular their shape, the more, and the
more heterogeneous, their elements and, in the case of pictures, the more they
distort the object they depict (Berlyne, 1958). Expectations are also important,
as suggested by the observation that stimuli are identified more easily if they
appear in a new color (Berlyne & Ditkofsky, 1976). These and other findings
demonstrate  that  events can grab our visual attention by virtue of their
particular visual structure alone—independent of their oddity with respect to
other, competing attentional targets—and they do so to the degree that they
surprise us, hence, if they violate our expectations. These kinds of effects are
of obvious importance for a whole range of everyday situations, whether we
talk of advertisement, fashion, art, or safety in car driving, so that one would
expect research on attentional capture to address them in one or the other way.
Third, a somewhat related issue, attentional capture is commonly
investigated without any consideration of the history of both target and
distractor stimuli. Given the broad and solid evidence that the degree to which
stimuli capture attention varies with  their  novelty (Cowan, 1997;  Sokolov,
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distractors over and over again, and commonly do not even  assess possible
habituation  effects. Lorch and colleagues have  investigated the impact of
habituation to picture distractors in a speeded classification task (Lorch,
Anderson & Well, 1984; Lorch & Horn, 1986), and they did find some
reduction of interference after a few pre-exposure trials already. Thus, it is not
unreasonable to assume that at least part of the capture effect can be
eliminated by some practice and/or by using predictable distractors.
Finally, it is interesting to note that attentional capture is almost
exclusively  measured in terms of distraction, that is, as interference  with
ongoing information processing. As most methods such an approach has its
strengths and weaknesses. If stimuli can be demonstrated to distract attention
even if they are entirely irrelevant to the task at hand (which to determine the
discussion about attentional sets has shown to be difficult, however), then we
indeed have very good reasons to believe that capture is truly automatic. But
this is a rather strong test and it does not tell us a lot about what grabs our
attention if we are not currently busy with a demanding reaction-time task.
Again, some consideration of Berlyne's (1960)  approach to curiosity may
provide some guidance to overcome this limitation.
To  sum  up,  Ruz & Lupiáñez sketch a research field in progress:
Approaches are in the process of overcoming the (probably too simplistic)
binary questions that seem to be typical for the initial steps of most research
(Newell, 1973) and move towards a more integrative view. To the degree that
this process is completed we can expect interesting contributions to more
general questions of how human behavior integrates bottom-up  processing
and top-down control, hence, how performance can be intentional and adaptive
at the same time.
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7.  Attentional  capture:  Biological  relevance,  multisensory
stimulation, and consciousness.
Alan Kingstone*, Shai Danziger**, Stephen R. H. Langton*** and
Salvador Soto-Faraco****
* University of British Columbia, Vancouver, CANADA.
** Ben Gurion University, ISRAEL
*** University of Stirling, SCOTLAND
**** Universitat de Barcelona, SPAIN
The authors Ruz and Lupiáñez are to be commended for a  thorough
overview of many of the key studies in the attention capture literature.  In the
present commentary we would like to suggest three lines along which future
attention capture research might be broadened: (1)  the role played by
biologically relevant stimuli; (2) the role played by multisensory stimulation,
and (c) the role played by consciousness.
Attention  capture  research  has focused almost  exclusively on the
interplay between primitive features of visual stimuli, such as shape (circle,
square,  diamond,  etc),  color  (red, green, blue, etc),  and  luminance  (abrupt
onset, abrupt offset, ramped onset, etc).   And as the excellent review by Ruz
and Lupiáñez has established, the conditions under which primitive features of
this sort can capture visuospatial attention are quickly becoming well
understood.  However, there is also a new  and growing body of research
which suggests that reflexive orienting of visuospatial attention may also turn
on the extent to which a stimulus is, or is not, biologically relevant (Langton,
Watt, & Bruce, 2000).  For instance, Kingstone and Friesen (1998), Langton
and Bruce (1999), Driver et al. (1999) have  each  shown  that  presenting a
picture of a face that has the eyes and/or the head turned to the left or right
will produce a shift in spatial attention to the gazed-at location -- even when
participants are instructed to ignore the gaze cue and are informed that the cue
does not predict where a visual target will  appear.  These findings, coupled
with the observation that the effect can emerge as soon as 100 ms after cue
onset, demonstrate that the effect is reflexive in nature.  Importantly, this
orienting  produced by a biologically relevant  stimulus has several  unique
characteristics that differentiate it from non-biologically relevant stimuli. First,
eye direction produces a shift in attention away from the location of the cue
itself (i.e., the eyes) and a shift in attention toward the location that is being
gazed-at.  This contrasts with the standard attentional capture finding whereby
attention is drawn towards the capturing stimulus.  Second, the beneficial
effect that gaze direction has on response latency lasts longer than anything
that is observed normally with a peripheral non-informative cue.  Namely,
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1000 ms or more when the attentional cue is directed gaze, but  facilitation
does not normally extend beyond cue-target intervals of 200-300 ms when
attention is drawn, say, to an abrupt peripheral onset.  Finally,  shifting
attention reflexively to a gazed-at location has failed to produce any evidence
that it results later in an inhibitory effect emerging at the gazed-at location. In
other words, unlike primitive stimulus features normally studied by attention
capture researchers, gaze direction does not appear to result in the inhibition
of  return phenomenon.  Indeed recent work by Friesen & Kingstone
(submitted)  suggests  that facilitation by gaze direction, and inhibition of
return, are dissociable effects that can co-occur.  In sum,  these  findings
suggest that reflexive orienting or spatial attention in response to biologically
relevant stimuli may represent a new and unique form of attentional capture.
Whether this form of orienting is amenable to endogenous modulation in a
manner similar to capture by simple features is a subject of future research.
As the authors correctly note at the outset of their paper, a multitude of
stimuli reach our senses at any given moment. However, this rich stimulation
is by nature not constrained to one single sensory modality, but rather it is
composed of a constellation of stimuli reaching different senses. There is a
growing  appreciation  among researchers that attentional selection is best
understood within a multisensory framework, superceding those of merely
visuospatial attention (see  Driver & Spence, 1998, for a review). Indeed,
attentional capture across stimulus modalities in the form of reflexive shifts of
attention  have  sometimes been proposed as an account  for  multisensory
integration phenomena in the spatial domain such as the ventriloquist illusion
whereby an auditory stimulus  is mislocalized toward a concurrent visual
event. Here, a reflexive shift of spatial attention in one modality is  thought to
capture spatial attention in a different modality (see  Caclin et al.,  2002;
Macaluso, Frith & Driver, 2000; McDonald, Teder-Sälejärvi, & Ward, 2001;
and Macaluso, Frith, & Driver, 2001, for a recent discussion). Importantly,
this type of capture between sensory modalities appears to generalize to a
number of modality combinations (i.e., touch and vision, touch and audition)
and across the spatial and the temporal domains (Caclin et al.,  2002; Soto-
Faraco et al., in press).  The  conclusions  reached by Ruz and Lupiañez´s
review  raise many interesting questions for future  research on attentional
capture across stimulus modalities. For example, whether a sensory modality
can by itself serve as a "capturing" dimension, and whether a sensory channel
can be established as a filter  thereby permitting endogenous processes to
modulate capture. Opening the field of attentional capture to a multisensory
framework will undoubtedly improve our  understanding human information
processing in real world environments.
Finally, an intriguing question that Ruz and Lupiáñez touch on concerns
the link between attentional capture and that of conscious awareness.  For the
most part attentional capture research has sought to determine the boundary
conditions under which different types of primitive features do (or do not)
capture attention and what role (if any) attentional goals play in capture.  In
most studies attentional capture is inferred from an increase in RT to respond
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distractors in the display.  One seemingly important question that has yet to
be resolved concerns  the degree to which attentional capture by unique
distractors co-occurs with awareness of the attentional capturing stimuli. We
would conjecture that many researchers implicitly assume that once a stimulus
captures attention, the stimulus is consciously perceived.  This however could
be incorrect and may exaggerate the putative link between attentional orienting
and awareness. It may be possible that stimuli that use attentional resources
do not always reach awareness.  Several recent studies support this view. First,
in a study of patients with visuospatial neglect, Danziger, Kingstone and Rafal
(1998) found that visuospatial attention is drawn to the location of a cue for
which there is no visual awareness. In this experiment target detection was
facilitated for targets that appeared at a cued location despite the fact that
subjects were not aware of the cues (see also Kentridge et al.  (1999) for
further evidence of dissociations between attention and awareness in patient
populations). In a study with  healthy  subjects McCormick (1997) found
further  evidence  for  spatial orienting without awareness, whereby visually
degraded cues, of which subjects were not aware, affected orienting behavior
to a subsequent target.  In three experiments targets typically appeared at the
location opposite that of the cued location. An interaction effect was observed.
When subjects were not aware of the cue,  RTs were faster when the target
appeared at the cued location than at the likely target location. In contrast,
when subjects were aware of the cue,  target detection was faster when the
target appeared at the likely target location than at the cued location. This
study shows that while cues  that are not consciously perceived  capture
attention reflexively, they do not affect endogenous shifts of attention. Finally,
and possibly of most relevance for the attentional capture literature, Theeuwes
et al. (1998), and Kramer et al. (2000) have shown that the eyes can be drawn
toward the location of an abrupt onset before landing on a target elsewhere,
and yet participants appear to have no conscious awareness of moving their
eyes to a distractor by mistake.  Taken together, these studies indicate that
attentional orienting to a stimulus need not always co-occur with awareness of
the attentionally grabbing stimulus.
In summary, the attentional capture research has made many significant
steps  forward  recently, as the review by Ruz and Lupiáñez has  clearly
demonstrated.  In the future there lie ahead many important and exciting lines
of research for investigation.
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8.  Endogenous  inhibitory  control of selection: Evidence from
preview search.
by Melina A Kunar, Jason J Braithwaite, Glyn W Humphreys
*
University of Birmingham, U.K.
The review of attentional capture research by Ruz & Lupianez provides
a useful summary of a complex and hotly debated research area. It is clear
from the literature that new objects are important for visual selection, and that
these items can enjoy a special status.  As Ruz & Lupianez point out, the
likelihood that new objects capture attention can be mediated by the intentional
set of the observer; attentional capture is most effective when participants are
set to prioritise the new stimuli.  Most usually, the intentional set of observers
is conceptualised in terms of a positive bias towards new items.  For example,
pre-activation of a system for detecting  transient  onsets  may help bias
selection towards new  events.  In addition to this, however,  attentional
prioritisation for new stimuli may be enhanced by a negative bias against old
items.  Such a negative bias has not been considered by Ruz & Lupianez, but
it may provide an important role in optimising selection.  Here we briefly
review evidence for negative bias effects helping to prioritise selection of the
‘new’.
Watson and Humphreys (1997) first argued for the role of a negative
bias in selecting new objects in a modified standard colour form conjunction
search task (e.g. Treisman & Gelade, 1980). Watson and Humphreys (1997)
decomposed the presentation of items across two displays, segregated by a 1-
second preview interval. They found that in the preview condition, search was
as efficient as when only the new items appeared alone (in a single feature
baseline condition) and it was considerably more efficient than in a
conjunction  baseline, when both sets of distractors were  presented
simultaneously.  They proposed  that the search  advantage in the preview
condition occurred in part because old items were actively inhibited (a process
they termed ‘visual marking’).  This inhibition was thought to depend on an
intentional, resource-limited mechanism.
Direct evidence for intentional  inhibitory effects comes from studies
using probe dot detection. Watson and Humphreys (2000) found that probe
dots were difficult to detect when presented at the locations of old items.
Interestingly,  probe  detection was only  impaired at old locations when
observers were engaged in search for new targets on a minority of trials; it did
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not occur when probe detection was the primary task (Watson & Humphreys,
2000).  This suggests that the effect is linked to an attentional-set against old
items in the search task, and not simply due to the temporal parameters of the
displays.  Furthermore, the efficient selection of new targets is reduced when
observers perform a demanding secondary task during the preview interval,
when only the old items are present (Humphreys, Watson & Joliceur, in
press;  Olivers and Humphreys, in press; Watson & Humphreys, 1997).
Indeed, when a secondary task is introduced (presumably removing
inhibition),  probe  detection at the location of old items actually improves
(Olivers & Humphreys, in press).
The origin of this “preview effect” has itself been debated, matching
the arguments about endogenous and exogenous control of selection of new
objects.  For example, in contrast to the top-down inhibitory account proposed
by Watson and Humphreys (1997), Donk and Theeuwes (2001) have recently
argued that the preview benefit is due to exogenous attentional capture by the
new stimuli.  Donk and Theeuwes (2001) failed to observe a preview benefit
when new items were isoluminant with the background.  They proposed that
new onsets are fundamental to the benefit, and inferred that this reflects the
potency of these signals for an exogeneously – controlled selection system.
However, these findings may also simply mean that, in order for old items to
be inhibited, they must have  been registered in some representational map
sensitive to dynamic change.   
The onset capture account holds that the old items are entirely irrelevant
to the preview benefit.  However studies using a top-up procedure counter
this. Kunar et al. (in press)  employed these preview  conditions. In the
standard preview condition (700 ms preview), old items were presented for
700 ms before the search set appeared. Search here was more efficient than in
a  conjunction baseline replicating Watson  and  Humphreys (1997). In a
second preview condition the old items appeared on the screen for just 150 ms
before the search set.  With such a brief preview, performance was no more
efficient than the conjunction baseline. The lack of benefit may be due to the
short time allowed to build – up inhibition, or to insufficient time to separate
the onsets of the old items from those of the new. In the third “top-up”
condition, preview items appeared for 450 ms, disappeared for 250 ms and
then re-appeared in their original positions 150 ms prior to the search set.
Previous work shows that, if the preview items disappear and then re-appear
with the onset of the search set, then any preview benefit is lost (Watson &
Humphreys, Experiment 6, 1997). Despite this, a preview benefit emerged in
the  “top-up”  condition.  This result is difficult to explain in terms of
attentional capture.  If a 250ms offset is sufficient to have old items compete
as new objects in one case (without the “top-up”  preview), then this should
also have occurred in the “top-up” condition.  Instead, it seems that the short
“top-up” of  the preview, before the new items was sufficient to recruit the
prior  memory  for  the old stimuli and this helps them to be ignored in
subsequent search.  Rather than being due to exogenous attentional capture by
new onsets, the coding (and inhibition) of stimuli as old distractors seems
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Other evidence against an onset capture account comes from studies
that manipulate the colours of the stimuli across old and new displays.  As
Ruz & Lupianez note, evidence for attentional capture come from experiments
on  singleton  interference;  where visual search is disturbed by a salient
distractor that differs in its features from the target.  Olivers and Humphreys
(submitted) report that  singleton  interference  within  search  displays is
strongly modulated by old previews.  For instance, a singleton colour in a
search display is much less effective when it shares its colour with preview
items.  Again, the old items influence performance in a manner consistent with
an inhibitory (in this case inhibition may be carried over to affect targets
sharing inhibited features), and contrary to an attentional capture view.
Braithwaite,  Humphreys  and  Hodsoll  (submitted a) have  similarly
shown that carry-over effects from old to new items influence search to the
new items. Previous studies of search have  demonstrated  that  targets in a
‘majority’ colour in a display are more difficult to find than target’s in a
‘minority’ colour (e.g. Bacon & Egeth, 1997; Egeth, Virizi, & Garbart, 1984;
Kaptein, Theeuwes & van der Heijden, 1995; Moore & Egeth, 1998; Poisson
& Wilkinson, 1992).  This result has been attributed to participants using the
ratio of colours in a new display to guide search.  However, this bias to a new
minority colour can be reversed if these minority items match the colour of
previews (Braithwaite et al., submitted a; Braithwaite Humphreys and Hodsoll,
submitted  b).  Here it seems that  inhibitory  colour  carry-over is more
influential than search guided by the colour properties of the new. Collectively
these studies suggest that, rather than simply prioritising onsets, participants
can adopt an inhibitory-set for old items.  The inhibitory-set for old items
operates on the basis of colour (grouping) as well as location, and it provides
a means of endogenous control of selection
REFERENCES
Bacon, W. F., & Egeth, H. E. (1997). Goal-directed guidance of attention: Evidence from
conjunctive visual search. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception
and Performance, vol 23(4), 948-961.
Braithwaite, J.J., Humphreys, G.W. & Hodsoll, J. (submitted a) Ignoring color over time:
Th  selective  effects of color on preview–based  visual  search of static  items.
Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology.
Braithwaite, J.J., Humphreys, G.W., & Hodsoll, J. (submitted b) Color grouping in space
and time: Evidence from negative color-based carry-over effects in preview  search.
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance.
Donk, M., & Theeuwes, J. (2001). Visual Marking beside the mark: prioritizing selection
by abrupt onsets. Perception & Psychophysics, 93, 891-900.
Egeth, H. E., Virzi, R. A., & Garbart, H. (1984). Searching for conjunctively defined
targets. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance,
10(1), 32-39.
Humphreys, G.W., Watson, D.G. & Joliceur, P. (in press) Fractionating visual marking:
Dual- task decomposition of the marking state by timing and modality.  Journal of
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception & Performance.Commentaries on Ruz & Lupiáñez (2002) 350
Kaptein, N. A., Theeuwes,  J., & van  der  Heijiden, A. H. C. (1995). Search for a
conjunctively defined target can be selectively limited to a colour defined subset of
elements.  Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human  perception and
Performance, 21, 1053-1069.
Kunar, M.A., Humphreys, G.W. & Smith, K.J. (in press). History matters: The preview
benefit in search is not onset capture. Psychological Science.
Moore, C. M., & Egeth, H. (1998). How does feature-based attention  affect  visual
processing?  Journal od Experimental Psychology: Humna  Perception and
Performance, Vol 24(No 4), 1296-1310.
Olivers, C. N. L., & Humphreys, G. W. (in press). Visual marking under attentional blink
conditions: More evidence  for top-down limited  capacity  inhibition.  Journal  of     
Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance. 
Olivers, C. N. L., & Humphreys, G. H. (submitted). Visual marking and  singleton
capture: Fractionating the unitary nature of visual selection. Cognitive Psychology.
Poisson, M. E., & Wilkinson, F. (1992). Distractor ratio and grouping processes in visual
     search. Perception, 21, 21-38.
Ruz, M., & Lupianez, J. (in press). A review of attentional capture: On its  automaticity
and  sensitivity to endogenous control. Psychologia.
Treisman, A., & Geldade, G. (1980). A feature integration theory of attention. Cognitive
Psychology, 12, 97-136.
Watson, D. G., & Humphreys, G. W. (1997). Visual marking: prioritizing selection for
new objects by top-down  attentional  inhibition of old  objects.  Psychological
Review, 104(1),  90-122.
Watson, D. G., & Humphreys, G. W. (2000). Visual marking: Evidence  for  inhibition
using a probe-dot detection paradigm. Perception & Psychophysics, 62, 471-481.Commentaries on Ruz & Lupiáñez (2002) 351
9. Attentional capture and cognitive control.
by Eduardo Madrid
*
Universidad de Granada
Advertisers have been flashing images on TV commercials for a long
time, not quite knowing why, relying on the intuition that this kind of ever-
changing stuff will  catch the attention of potential buyers.  Now  cognitive
psychologists have a good deal of data and knowledge about how human
attention is captured and the target article by Ruz and Lupiáñez (R&L) is an
excellent review of this research effort. From the R&L review it seems that
commercial-makers will never succeed in producing the ultimate spot, the one
that absolutely nobody will be able to ignore, as the conclusion of the target
article is that the individual immediate goals  can override the effect of
stimulus-driven attentional capture. In this comment we will consider how the
automaticity of attentional capture could survive  even in front of this
conclusion. Attentional capture will be considered in the wider context of the
control of cognitive processes.
Attentional capture, as a mechanism of selective attention, is regarded as
basic to the construction of focal awareness (Posner & Raichle, 1994). It has
been  assumed  that we are aware of stimuli that are within our focus of
attention and unaware of stimuli that are outside the current focus of attention
(Cowan, 1995; Klatzky, 1984; Mandler, 1975; Miller, 1962; Posner & Boies,
1971). In that sense the question about what conditions external stimulation
has to meet in order to attract the focus of our attention can be rephrased in
terms of awareness: Exist any value or feature that will give to stimuli showing
it direct access to our  awareness?. The research effort reviewed by R&L
addresses extensively this question and points out that discontinuities both in
the temporal (transients, abrupt onsets, new  objects) and spatial domains
(“singletons”,  saliency) are likely to reflexively attract attention and to
automatically trigger awareness of then. Most importantly, this seems to be
the case provided that the observer attention is not engaged in anything else; if
he/she is engaged, what attracts attention depends on the current task structure
and on the goal the subject is trying to achieve. In other words, it seems that it
is  the  relationship of stimuli properties and target  finding properties the
critical factor for attentional capture to occur and not any absolute property of
the stimuli.
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Folk and its coworkers (Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992) proposed
a theory of cognitive control where reflexive control of attention is analogous
to the functioning of a thermostat. In an air conditioning machine, once the
pretended temperature is settled up (i.e., the task settings are generated) the
thermostat will have the “control”  and will start up the engine (attention will
be captured) if the temperature departs from the aimed value. It can be said
that the thermostat has some “automatic control” on the performance of the
cooling system. In the case of human performance the cognitive  goal  will
determine the processing settings in advance (off-line); once those settings are
in  place,  the appearance of stimuli matching relevant values in some
dimensions will capture attention with no additional involvement of cognitive
control processes
2, in that sense, mechanism for attentional capture have some
degree of “automatic control”.
Folk  and his co-workers (Folk et al.,  1992)  model  postulates  goal
setting processes and performing processes as two functionally differentiated
kind of processes. This view  stand  against one in which the control of
performance or attention is a by-product of other processes as priming
(Johnston & Dark, 1986) or competitive  neural interactions (Desimone &
Duncan,  1995).  Both  views  (control  processes as a causal force or
“attentional  effects” as by-products)  have  been considered incompatible,
however,  like in some other issues in attention research, this kind of
dichotomization can turn out to be, as it was in the early-late selection debate,
not fair with the flexibility that the human processor is able to exhibit. The
rather long history in the research of those dichotomies could be due, at least
in part, to the limited sensitivity of pure performance measures (reaction time
and accuracy) to resolve then. Reaction time measures are well suited to study
the processes involved on a single trial. However, behavioral measures could
be  less  than optimal if we are interested in processes  that –like control
processes- develop mostly outside of the interval between the stimulus and the
response.  Control  processes  are likely to be on by the beginning of the
session, when the observer is trying to figure out what is expected  from
him/her. Additionally, on the practice trials it is likely that the processing
resources needed to deal with the task are settled on in the right sequence,
contrasting  the  task instructions with  the actual stimulation. Furthermore,
during single specific trials, e.g., like those were the observer do wrong and
realize it, control processes are likely to be active as well, and to remain so
during the inter trial interval, what can lead to worse performance for the next
few trials. There are many other situations where control processes could get
active, in any case those are  situations  where the behavioral measures are
somehow  limited in their sensitivity to those  control  processes.  Some
techniques of the cognitive neuroscience (ERPs and functional neuroimaging
in particular) have  almost obliterated those  limitations. The acquisition of
continuous and direct data from the brain of the observer as he/she performs a
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cognitive task has proven to be extremely useful both, in getting insight about
the functional architecture of the mind and in getting a better understanding of
the organization and interaction of neural processes. From the  cognitive
neuroscience arena, a distinction has arose between neural networks that are
the source of attentional signals and neural networks where attentional effects
express  themselves (Corbetta, 2000;  LaBerge,  1995) . This distinction, in
some  extent,  parallels the one proposed by Folk et al.  (1992) in the
“thermostat”  model mentioned above. Cognitive goals are conveyed by the
instructions given. Instructions must be decoded, stored and funneled to the
processing system. The activity of the instructions-to-goal “translator”  will
result in an attentional template in order to perform the task, that will include
directions at the trial time-scale as well as at larger time-scales. Once that this
multidimensional attentional template is settled up, the processing system can
proceed in an automatic way,  and attentional capture by distracters  sharing
dimensional values with targets will  automatically occur as a by-product of
what task the system is trying to perform. We humans have the capability to
–within  milliseconds-  generate a new  specific arrangement of neural
machinery on demand, recruited and coordinated in order to perform a task.
What the R&L review  suggest is that what an stimulus is going to trigger
depends very much on what are we trying to do or perceive. The interaction
between the control mechanisms and the processing mechanisms that results
in human behavior is receiving nowadays extra attention. At the stimulus to
response (S-R) translation end, similar conclusions to the reported by R&L
are drawn: automatic processes of S-R translation are modulated by the
intentions or goals of the acting person (Hommel, 2000). The specification of
the interaction, at different levels, of goal-generating and control processes
with the processes implementing the treatment of the information is perhaps
the next challenge, and the review of R&L is a very useful tool for researchers
heading this direction.   
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10. Commentary on Ruz and Lupiáñez’s “A review of attention
capture: On its automaticity and sensitivity to endogenous control”
by Bruce Milliken
*
McMaster University, Canada
One of the main themes of the review by Ruz and Lupiáñez is that
attention capture can be modulated by endogenous processes.  That attention
capture can involve  more than just a reflexive  orienting  response  toward
salient events has led to a rich variety of visual search and cueing procedures
to measure properties of attention  capture, as pointed out in the review.
However, the notion that endogenous processes can contribute to attention
capture may have equally interesting, although less obvious, implications for
other research domains.
A fundamental implication of attention capture may be that the cognitive
system makes use of the difference between a predicted and actual occurrence.
Presumably, we orient to sudden  loud  noises  because they produce
representations that differ markedly from prediction.  Now, introducing the
notion that endogenous processes can modulate attention capture implies that
we  can be more or less sensitive to this  difference  between  predicted and
observed events.  This appears to be the essence of Bacon and Egeth’s (1994)
distinction between being or not being in discrepancy detection mode.  What
implications might a discrepancy detection mode have  beyond the
conventionally defined attention capture domain?  Consider a task in which a
prime (or cue) is followed by a probe (or target), and the prime and probe are
either related or unrelated.  Of course, related probes are usually responded to
more quickly than unrelated probes (i.e.,  repetition  priming).  However, if
participants can engage in a discrepancy detection mode, then the discrepancy
between an unrelated prime and probe pair could conceivably  produce an
effect opposite to repetition priming.  That is, to the extent that discrepant
probes  can attract attention, one might expect performance for  unrelated
probes to be more efficient than for related probes.
This possibility is noteworthy because when such effects are observed
(e.g.,  negative  priming,  inhibition of return, repetition blindness), they are
often attributed to inhibition processes.  The logic underlying this type of
attribution is that inhibition of the internal representation of a prime (or cue)
will  subsequently show up as slowed performance for a related  probe (or
target).  However, if attention can be captured by discrepancy, and if this
attention capture can produce particularly efficienct performance for unrelated
trials, then there may be no need to posit an inhibition process  that  slows
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responses for related trials.  In effect, to explain “inhibitory”  priming and
cueing phenomena, one may not need more than the mechanism that produces
attention capture.
The notion that attention capture is subject to endogenous control would
then be an important tool to explain why “inhibitory”  priming effects are
often sensitive to task demands.
Of course, this argument requires an extension of the processes that
cause attention capture at a location in space to dimensions other than spatial
location.  Attempts to push in this direction may or may not meet  with
success, but given the possible gains in parsimony it seems a worthwhile step
to take.  If some success is met, it would suggest that attention capture at a
location in space is a particular manifestation of a general attentional principle,
whereby resources are allocated in response to processing discrepancies.Commentaries on Ruz & Lupiáñez (2002) 357
11. Commentary on Ruz and Lupiáñez’s “A review of attention
capture: On its automaticity and sensitivity to endogenous control”
by Bob Rafal
*
University of Wales, Bangor, UK
In  their  valuable  review  Ruz and Lupiañez note that  neurological
patients with the syndrome of hemispatial neglect offer a special opportunity
to  investigate the capture of unattended stimuli. Individuals with  this
syndrome, which typically involves the right parietal lobe, may be unaware of
objects and events in the visual field contralateral to the lesion, even  though
sensory visual pathways are intact. A common observation in bedside tests is
that of extinction: patients can report the presence of a contralesional item
presented alone, but fail to report its presence when it appears together with a
competing  ipsilesional  item. That is, the competing  ipsilesional stimulus
causes the contralesional item to be extinguished from awareness.
A  simple  clinical  observation  has  shown,  however,  that  features of
unattended stimuli in the contralesional field are,  nevertheless  processed
outside of awareness: namely, that there is less extinction when two competing
objects are different, than when they are the same (Rafal, 1994). In a sense,
when there are two different items present, both are ‘singletons’; and this may
be viewed as an example of singleton ‘popout’.  Baylis,  Driver, & Rafal,
(1993) extended this clinical observation to demonstrate that  this singleton
popout is contingent upon attentional control settings. They showed that the
similarity of features determined whether the contralesional object was
extinguished only if the  features  were relevant to the task. On each trial
coloured letters appeared either unilaterally or bilaterally and the patients were
asked to report what they saw. In one condition patients were asked to name
only the letter(s) (X or E), and in another to report only the color(s) (red or
green) that they saw. Extinction occurred more frequently when the bilateral
stimuli were the same on the attribute to be reported than when they were
different on this attribute, and more frequently than when the stimuli were the
same on the irrelevant  attribute. In blocks  that  required  letter naming,
extinction was not ameliorated if the stimuli were of different colours; and vice
versa for the color report blocks. These results  demonstrate not only that
information about shape and color of neglected objects is encoded, but also
that access of this information to conscious awareness is contingent upon task
goals.
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 In this earlier study, the patients' responses were determined solely on
the  basis of simple  visual  features (color or shape). Competition for
awareness could therefore be due either to competition among objects sharing
the relevant visual feature, or between objects sharing the same implications
for response. The former could be implemented on the basis of competitive
feature selection early in the visual pathway, while the latter implies preserved
early visual processing and biased selection at a later level of semantics and/or
response.
Some  recent work in a single patient  suggests  that  access to
consciousness is gated at the level of processing at which the meaning of the
stimulus is used to determine action. Patient JP was tested in a task requiring
a response based on the semantics of the items, while visual similarity between
concurrently presented items was manipulated. The stimuli were the words
“ONE”  and  “TWO”  and the numerals “1”  and  “2”  that appeared,
randomly, in the left field, the right field  or both fields. She was asked to read
the item(s) and to report what was present in each visual field by responding
“one” (indicating either the word "ONE" or the digit "1"), “two”  (the word
"TWO" or the digit "2"), or “nothing”.  The  responses  here  were,  thus,
contingent upon the semantic meaning of the stimulus  (i.e. what it denotes in
terms of numerosity), and independent of its visual features or category (i.e.
whether a word or digit).
  If selection is determined solely by allocation of attention to perceptual
features, then perceptual similarity should modulate the degree of extinction.
If selection is determined solely by the allocation of attention to the semantic
meaning required for response selection, then visual similarity  between the
competing items should not influence extinction. Figure 1A shows that there
was more extinction when the items shared the same meaning and required the
same response, than when they required different responses c
2 (1) = 6.35, p =
0.02. This was the case whether they were  from  the same category and
visually identical (e.g. ONE + ONE) or were from different categories and
visually dissimilar (e.g. ONE + 1).
In a second experiment the task was changed and she was asked to
report the category of each item (“word” or” digit”). In contrast to the first
experiment, in this experiment items from the same category required the
same response. Figure 1B shows that in this experiment there was, in contrast
to the first experiment, an effect of category (c
2(1)
  = 9.03,  p = .0027). That is,
pairs of items that required the same response showed more extinction than
those requiring different responses, regardless of perceptual or semantic
similarity.  Note,  however,  that there was also an independent effect of
semantics (c
2(1)
 = 5.55,_p  <  .02).  We  can provisionally conclude that
attentional selection gates access to awareness at both the level of semantics
and the level of response  selection.  However, we cannot conclude that
attentional selection at the level of semantics is automatic and obligatory since,
in  this  experiment,  semantics could be used in determining the correct
response, e.g. patients might read the stimuli as a step in determining their
category.Commentaries on Ruz & Lupiáñez (2002) 359Commentaries on Ruz & Lupiáñez (2002) 360
JP was tested in a third experiment in which not only were semantics
irrelevant to the task, but she was also explicitly required to ignore semantics
to perform it successfully: to report the number of characters present in each
field. Thus, the correct response  was  “One”  for  digits and “Three” for
words; and response selection did not require any access to semantics. The
items for this experiment were 2, TWO, 6 and SIX.  Note that, with this
stimulus  set,  not only is the semantic meaning of the items irrelevant to
selecting the correct response, but simple reading of the items would compete
with generation of a correct response, since neither “Two”  nor “Six”  was a
correct response. The task, then, not only makes semantic  analysis of the
stimuli irrelevant, but JP needed to inhibit reading of the items in order to
prevent them from competing with the correct response. This is essentially a
Stroop-like situation in which word/numeral reading is always incompatible
with the correct response, and inhibition of word reading would provide the
optimal strategy for task performance. Figure 1C shows, as was the case in
the second experiment, that items sharing the same response (ONE + ONE)
showed more extinction than did pairs sharing the same semantics but
requiring a different response (ONE + 1) c
2(1) =6.14, p=0.013. Moreover, in
this experiment, semantic similarity had no effect: that is, there was as much
extinction between (1 + 1) as (1 + 6) ; or (ONE + ONE) as (ONE + SIX).
The current preliminary observations in patient JP provide further
evidence that that attetional capture is contingent attentional control settings
and  suggest  that attention can grant or deny access to the gates ofCommentaries on Ruz & Lupiáñez (2002) 361
consciousness at a stage of processing at which the meaning of the visual
stimulus is utilised in selecting it for action.
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12. A Review that should Capture your Attention: Commentary
on Ruz & Lupianez
by Jurjen van der Helden and Harold Bekkering
*
University of Groningen, The Netherlands
The paper of Maria Ruz and Juan Lupianez on attentional capture is
excellent for at least three reasons. First, they succeeded in describing very
clearly the results of almost two decades of research after attentional capture
(AC) even when produced in complicated paradigms. Second, their timing of a
thorough and critical  review on the role of automaticity and endogenous
control in AC is accurate as more and more models incorporate endogenous
modulations on low-level information processing levels. Finally, the insights
provided in this review on attentional capture are also very  meaningful for
other paradigms used to study the processes of visual attention.
Relevance for other attentional paradigms: Attentional Blink
We would like to begin where Ruz & Lupianez finished their review,
namely the observation that several theories recently state that early low-level
information processing stages of visual perception can be governed by the
very endogenous control settings. There is accumulating evidence for the view
that humans are able to transfer a relevant stimulus modality from the top to
the bottom into the earliest processing levels in such a way that these relevant
endogenous settings capture attention and that irrelevant singleton stimulus
modalities do no longer capture attention 'automatically'. For instance, Visser,
Bischof, & DiLollo (1999) came to a similar conclusion on basis of a review
of the data of the 'Attention Blink' (AB) phenomenon. AB emerges when
subjects have to report a second target within 200 to 500 ms. after a first target
in a stream of stimuli. That is, under these circumstances subjects fail to report
the second target in ca 80 % of the cases. Interestingly, when the second target
is presented within  200 ms. this failure is sometimes absent. This Lag-1
Sparing, as Visser et al called it, was absent when target 1 and 2 differed in a)
location or b) stimulus modality (for example, color and movement). This led
them to conclude that a low-level processing stage can be set by endogenous
control that opens a door for further processing in a later stage. This ‘door’
shuts immediately for stimuli presented elsewhere or in another modality, but
remains open for still 200 ms. more when on the same location another target
emerges in the same modality.
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Back to Attentional Capture
In the paradigm of Folk et al.  (1992)  paradigm, to recapitulate, two
consecutive frames in which the first was irrelevant and the second contained a
target (see Fig 3. in Ruz & Lupianez). The first frame contained an irrelevant
singleton. In some blocks these singletons occupied the same location as the
targets (valid trails), in other blocks they were presented on different locations
(invalid trails). The second frame contained a target either overlapping or non-
overlapping the dimension of the singleton. The invalid condition (singletons
and targets were  presented on different locations) singletons with no
dimensional overlap with the target did not induce RT-costs. However, this
would be expected if all singletons capture attention automatically. Theeuwes,
Atchley, & Kramer  (2000) used Theeuwes' (1991a, 1992)  Visual  Search
paradigm. Subjects had to ignore a color singleton distractor presented at
different stimulus onset asynchronies (SOA's) prior to the search display in
which  they  had to search for a shape singleton target.  When  presented
simultaneously the irrelevant color singleton disrupted search performance,
indicating an involuntary orienting reaction. This effect was eliminated when
the  SOA  was  150 ms. or longer. They concluded singletons do initially
capture attention and soon after attention is disengaged from that location.
Apparently, Theeuwes et al. ’s study shows that a singleton attracts attention
for a short time (for 150 ms.) even  when the singleton and target do not
overlap dimensionally. This is different in the case that the subject has to
report the first stimulus too. That is, the study of Visser et al., described above,
did show that there is no Lag-1 Sparing when target 1 and 2 differ in stimulus
dimension. In addition, the Folk and Remington (1998) study shows that a
spatial capture paradigm is more sensitive for attentional control settings than
is the visual search paradigm of Theeuwes (1991a, 1992) (p. 26). Attentional
capture effects on the target are only measured when a target appears in the
same location and in the same modality as the preceding singleton. Similarly,
Lag-1 Sparing is only seen when the first and the second target overlap in
location and stimulus dimension.
ERP’s
There are some basic problems with  solving the debate of AC with
using RT-measures only.  In fact, Folk and Remington (1998) on the one
hand  state  that  RT-effects  ‘should  not  invariably lead to an attentional
orienting interpretation’ (p. 23) while Theeuwes, Atchley, and Kramer (2001)
on the other hand state that ‘a null reaction time effect does not necessarily
rule out that a singleton  has  captured  attention’  (p. 26). In other  words,
reaction  time is not the most  powerful tool to determine whether the
automaticity in attentional capture is a hard-wired bottom-up  effect in its
origin or that its ‘defaults’  can be overcome by endogenous settings. An
alternative promising method is to measure the event related potential (ERP)
during visual processing in time. For example, Arnott et al. (2001) used the
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modulated by stimuli sharing task-relevant attributes only, and singletons that
showed  capture effects in RT evoked a negative modulation before
presentation of the target compared to singletons that did not show capture
effects in RT. This finding indicates that at least in the Folk et al.  (1992)
paradigm the 'task set modulates processing of cues at early stages of sensory
processing' (p. 19). Other ERP data  not  directly  testing the hypotheses
discussed here can be useful too. Luck and Hillyard (1994) carried out an
ERP study that focused on pop-out stimuli (singletons) in visual search, very
similar to the Theeuwes’ paradigm.). They showed in four experiments that
certain ERP components were enhanced when subjects were presented with
displays with pop-outs (contralateral P1 and the anterior N2), these did not
reflect a fully automatic pop-out detection processes. They showed, however,
that specific components were enhanced when the pop out happened to be the
target. This indicates that pop-out induce no (early) component modulation on
it self per se (which would be expected when pop-outs were  processed in
separate,  hard-wired routes), rather, these components are modulated
according to the relevancy of the pop-outs.  This finding mirrors the
contingent involuntary orienting hypothesis. ERP data in both paradigms (i.e.
Spatial Cuing and Visual Search) tend to subscribe the notion that singletons
are not processed in hard-wired highway to attention and these findings can
play a decisive role in this theoretical discussion. Thus, the combination of
behavioral studies in terms of RT and the use of brain-imaging methods with
a high temporal resolution like ERP and MEG seems to be a promising way
to resolve some long-standing issues in the attentional literature so far. Of
course, in these combined research approach, experimenters should still be
well aware of the dangers that have  also haunted classical RT-research. For
instance, 'the research method chosen to explore attentional capture can have
consequences  for  the  inferences  that are drawn' as Ruz and Lupianez
legitimately finish their review (p.27).
Conclusion
As more and more models on visual attention currently state, we are
inclined towards a view  that automaticity can be governed by endogenous
control. This and other insights as derived  from  the now overwhelming
amount of literature on Attentional Capture can and should  facilitate the
research on other attentional  phenomena as Attentional  Blink. In addition,
experimental research on Attentional Capture can and has to be inspired by
new research methods and existing models of visual attention. Furthermore,
we  suggest  that  psychophysiological methods like  ERP  can calibrate the
interpretations of the fragile RT-effects. To conclude, not only because of its
importance for overviewing the literature on AC,  but also for the insights it
provides about the processes of visual attention in general, the review of Ruz
and  Lupianez is one which  should  capture  your  attention  (but not fully
automatically).Commentaries on Ruz & Lupiáñez (2002) 365
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13. Attentional  Capture and its manifestation on performance:
New perspectives in the study of the Attentional Capture phenomena.
Reply by Ruz & Lupiáñez
University of Granada
The nature and characteristics of the interaction between top-down and
bottom-up  processing in the cognitive system is a theoretical  question
currently guiding research in diverse  fields of Cognitive  Psychology. The
growing literature in the field of Attentional Capture (AC), reviewed in this
article and extended in the commentaries, is a paradigmatic example of this
interest.
As such, AC is an empirical effect in which RT to detect a stimulus is
modified by the presence of a singleton, i.e., a stimulus unique in some
dimension. The theory behind this effect assumes that it reflects the spatial
orienting of attention to the location occupied by the singleton. When  this
singleton is irrelevant to the task and it is not used by any means to perform
the search, the capture is said to be automatic, that is, uncontaminated by top-
down strategies.
Evidence now seems to give a role for both exogenous and endogenous
factors in AC effects. Both static and dynamic singletons are able to generate
AC in paradigms such as the Identity Intrusion (Theeuwes and Burger, 1998)
or the Distance Method (Turatto & Galfano, 2000), which are situations that
meet the conditions for the capture to be considered ‘purely automatic’ (see
Galfano & Turatto’s commentary). On the other hand, research methods such
as the Precueing Paradigm (Folk, Remington, & Johnston, 1992) show that
endogenous factors are able to modulate AC effects to a great extent. These
and other data lead to the idea that AC might be automatic by default, but that
it is also sensitive to endogenous control, which is a conclusion supported by
most of the commentaries.
One  important  issue to be solved is how endogenous  attention
modulates AC. Accordingly, a main debate among researchers in the field
concerns at which processing level top-down factors do operate (see Arnott &
Pratt’s commentary). Whereas some authors argue that attentional sets act as
a filter (Folk & Remington, 1998) that enable attention to focalize only on
items congruent with the current task set, others contend that the top-down
modulation operates by speeding up the disengagement of attention from
stimuli not matching the set (Theeuwes, Atchley & Kramer, 2000). The
former notion corresponds to the contingent allocation of attention hypothesis,
where all AC effects are modulated by top down factors; whereas the latter
stresses the automaticity of AC in its very beginning. As noted above, there is
evidence  favouring  both  positions but using rather different research
paradigms. One  prototypic  example of this  divergence of results  between
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This authors showed that exactly the same visual search was indicative of AC
when RT was examined by means of the display size method, whereas an
inspection using the display size indicated no AC at all.
These results could indicate that some methods are more sensitive than
others for measuring AC. Importantly, however, it could also be the case that
the different methods are tapping rather different processes  related to AC.
Some of them may be more sensitive to perceptual competition processes that
take place at an early point of attentional deployment (Desimone & Duncan,
1995), whereas others may reflect the operation of an exogenous  attention
orienting mechanism separated from perceptual processors (Posner &
Petersen,  1990).  The fact that they are all  named AC effects does not
necessarily mean that they all reflect the operation of the same underlying
processes. Indeed, it may be the case that AC effects found  with  different
research paradigms are tapping different underlying attention-related
phenomena. Thus, it is important to distinguish between AC as an empirical
effect, and the theoretical explanation offered for this effect.
On  the other hand, as some authors have  implicitly  done (Folk &
Remington,  1998;  Theeuwes et al.,  2000), it might also be theoretically
relevant to differentiate  between the actual capture of attention and the
manifestation of this capture on performance (i.e., the AC effect). For
example, if attention is captured in a specific location but then it is disengaged
before  the target appears, this  capture  will  not manifest on behaviour.
Furthermore, even after attention has been disengaged, the previous capture of
attention can manifest itself on performance in either a positive or negative
way,  leading, in the latter case, to phenomena  like  Inhibition of Return
(Milliken) or inhibitory visual marking (Kunar, Braithwaite & Humphreys).
What these examples show is that the processes involved in the capture
of attention itself can be rather different from those responsible for the effects
that the captured attention has on behaviour by the time the target appears.
However,  perhaps  the  dissociation is difficult to make with behavioural
methods, because a single response measure is taken (RT/error rate to the
target), which supposedly reflects the joint effects of different processes at
different moments (capture of attention and its manifestation). In this sense,
future research will benefit from new brain recording technologies (Arnott &
Pratt;  Madrid;  van  der Helden & Bekkering), which allow continuous
recording of different dependent measures in the absence of open behaviour.
Some of the commentaries made to the target article touched on several
of the above referred topics. One of the main concerns was related to what an
attentional control setting is and how it operates (Arnott & Pratt; Galfano &
Turatto). Kunar et al. proposed that the ability some features, such as new
objects, appear to have in capturing attention might be complemented by an
attentional marking mechanism, which they conceive as the inhibition of old
objects to capture attention. Milliken suggests,  however,  that  this kind of
inhibitory processes leading to a lack of attentional capture by old objects
might rather be considered as a lost of novelty,  without the concept of
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Hoffman, on the other hand, elaborated the possibility that attentional
control settings operate by the generation of a template matching the searched
for features, i.e., an anticipation, which in turn would select those features for
further  processing. It would be interesting to investigate whether this
anticipation  modulates the capture of attention or its manifestation on
performance. One possibility is that new or salient stimuli capture attention
(i.e., trigger a call for attention) in a bottom-up manner. However, only those
stimuli anticipated by the control setting will lead to the manifestation of the
attentional capture, by allowing them to access consciousness (Rafal).
Rafal, and also Bartolomeo, showed how useful can hemispatial neglect
be for deepening our understanding of several topics in AC, such as the level
of  representation at which the attentional control  settings  operate.  Other
commentaries stressed the possible links between the AC and the Attentional
Blink phenomenon (van  der Helden & Bekkering) or noted the general
principles that may underlie both the AC and other effects, such as Negative
Priming and Inhibition of Return,  i.e.,  the allocation of resources to
processing discrepancies (Milliken).
Some authors drew links between AC and other research problems such
as consciousness (Godijn & Theeuwes;  Kingstone,  Danziger,  Langton &
Soto-Faraco; Madrid). Godijn & Theeuwes, for example, made the interesting
suggestion  that  those forms of AC either leading or not to conscious
awareness may be related to an either slow or fast disengagement of attention
from the stimuli, respectively. Thus, the capture of attention may have different
manifestations on behaviour depending on the speed of disengagement.
Indeed, that AC either leads or not to consciousness might be just one
example of those differential manifestations. As stated above, AC might lead
to opposite effects, depending on different variables.
Finally, several commentaries discussed  different challenges the
growing field of AC must confront (Hommel; Hoffman; Kingstone et al.;
Madrid; Milliken; van der Helden & Bekkering). Apart from the hard task of
operationally specifying some ill-defined terms, such as saliency, broadening
the scope of the AC research seems to be one of the main needs in the field.
Some of the future lines may include the relevance of habituation processes
and oddity in orienting attentional resources, AC between sensory modalities,
the special status biologically relevant stimuli may have in capturing attention
and the specification of the links  between AC and conscious awareness.
Moreover, this future research will for sure benefit from the inclusion of brain
imaging techniques to the field (Arnott & Pratt; Madrid; van  der Helden &
Bekkering). This new facilities would allow, among other things, to study to
what extent all the AC effects  reviewed in the article are actually tapping
exactly the same attentional effects or rather different, but related, phenomena.
The distinction between the attentional capture and its manifestation on
performance,  together  with  the  consideration of processes  related to
disengaging of attention,  might  also be helpful to further increase our
understanding of the AC phenomena and their modulation by endogenous
control.Commentaries on Ruz & Lupiáñez (2002) 369
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